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Hundreds of state regulations were passed during the “managed care backlash” 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many of these anti-managed care regulations eased 
or eliminated constraints on patient utilization of health care services imposed by 
managed care organizations. Other regulations gave managed care providers more 
flexibility in the way they practiced care or helped patients appeal denials of claims. 
Despite the effort undertaken to pass these regulations, limited research exists on 
whether the regulations achieved their goal. To fill this gap, this study takes advantage 
of the variety of regulations enacted during the managed care backlash of the late 
1990s and early 2000s to investigate their impact on patient-reported quality of care and 
mortality for managed care enrollees.  
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a nationally-representative 
survey of health care expenditures and experiences, provided information for the three 
patient-reported outcomes in this analysis: access to care, confidence in provider, and 
patient satisfaction with care. Mortality was determined by linking the MEPS data to the 
 National Death Index. Data for 1996, 2000, and 2004 were examined. A difference-in-
difference-in-difference approach was used to investigate the change in outcomes for 
managed care patients in states with moderate- and high-intensity backlash regulations 
relative to managed care patients in states with low-intensity regulations.  
The results indicate the regulations did improve patient-reported outcomes, but to 
varying degrees and only in the latter period of the backlash. Specifically, managed care 
enrollees who lived in states that adopted moderate-intensity regulations between 2000 
and 2004 reported relatively better improvements in access to care and confidence in 
their provider than did managed care enrollees in states with low-intensity backlash 
regulations. The positive effect on access to care was similar in states that adopted 
high-intensity regulations. However, no positive effect was found for any outcome in the 
first period (1996-2000). These results show that states with the most intense regulatory 
backlash did not realize better patient-reported outcomes. Instead, states that pursued 
moderate-intensity backlash regulations experienced relatively better outcomes for their 
managed care enrollees. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Study Problems 
This study examines the impact of the managed care regulatory backlash on 
patient outcomes for managed care enrollees. In the late 1990s, almost one-third of 
Americans with private health insurance were enrolled in managed care plans (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2002). During that time, managed care organizations (MCOs) 
pursued cost savings by negotiating payment directly with providers and by enforcing 
strict utilization rules (Rodwin, 1997). Negative public sentiment arose from the 
widespread belief that access to services and quality of care was suffering due to the 
cost-driven decisions of MCOs (Goldberg, 1999). A “backlash” against managed care 
began in 1990s, leading to hundreds of state regulations in all fifty states mandating 
changes for these companies (Pinkovskiy, 2014). While clinical quality was found to be 
generally equivalent between people with managed care and traditional fee-for-service 
(FFS) insurance, managed care patients often had worse patient-reported outcomes 
(PROs) (Miller & Luft, 2002). In particular, managed care enrollees in the 1990s 
reported relatively lower satisfaction with care and worse access to care (Miller & Luft, 
1997; Phillips, Mayer, & Aday, 2000).  
A principal goal of the managed care backlash regulations was to ensure 
patients’ access to essential health care services and improve quality of care (Zelman, 
1999). Despite the passage of hundreds of state laws in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
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to do so, limited research exists on whether the regulations had those intended 
outcomes. To fill this gap, this study investigates the impact of managed care laws on 
access to care, confidence in provider, patient satisfaction with care, and mortality. 
Study Scope 
 This study takes advantage of the variety of regulations enacted during the 
managed care backlash of the late 1990s and early 2000s to investigate their impact on 
quality of care for managed care enrollees. Patient-reported access to care is the first 
PRO examined since the bulk of the regulations specifically sought to enhance this 
aspect of quality. The second PRO included in this study is patient confidence in their 
provider. During the backlash of the late 1990s and early 2000s, many managed care 
patients believed treatment decisions were being driven by cost concerns and not the 
quality of their care (Baker & McClellan, 2001). This belief was thought to undermine 
confidence or trust in the patient-provider relationship and lead to dissatisfaction with 
care. The third PRO in this study is patient satisfaction with care, which was found to be 
consistently lower for managed care patients relative to FFS patients before the 
backlash (Miller & Luft, 2002). The fourth outcome studied is overall mortality. Past 
research is mixed on whether mortality for managed care patients significantly differed 
from those with FFS insurance (Miller & Luft, 2002). A 2014 analysis on the impact of 
the managed care backlash on health care spending and mortality suggests the 
regulations did not significantly affect mortality (Pinkovskiy, 2014). However, only state-
level mortality data were used and the results are described as measuring the impact of 
increased managed care prevalence and not necessarily the regulatory backlash. This 
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analysis will help clarify Pinkovskiy’s results on mortality using more sophisticated data 
and methods.  
This study investigates whether the managed care regulatory backlash affected 
two domains of care quality: patient-reported outcomes and mortality. Specifically, in 
states that adopt relatively intense managed care backlash regulations, do managed 
care enrollees experience: 
1. Improved access to care?  
2. More satisfaction with their care? 
3. More confidence in their providers? 
4. Lower overall mortality?   
Background 
Managed care.  
Most working Americans had fee-for-service (FFS) health insurance plans 
obtained through their employer in the second half of the twentieth century (Shi & Singh, 
2014). In traditional employer-sponsored FFS insurance plans, insurance companies 
were paid premiums by employers to cover the cost of health care services for their 
employees. Large firms could also self-insure and pay for medical bills directly. With 
FFS insurance, employees obtained services from their choice of provider, the provider 
submitted a claim (i.e., bill) to the insurance company or employer, and the provider was 
reimbursed. Patients usually paid a small deductible or co-payment for services. 
Providers reimbursed using FFS insurance relied on the volume of care they delivered 
to sustain their income. Providers had an inherent incentive to supply more care than 
necessary to increase their income, such as by ordering unnecessary tests (Glied & 
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Zivin, 2002). Beginning in the 1980s, many providers also began utilizing new and 
expensive technologies to treat their FFS patients (Bodenheimer, 2005). Soon after, 
health care expenditures grew rapidly due partly to provider-induced demand and often 
unjustifiable utilization of costly technologies (Emanuel & Fuchs, 2008). The high cost of 
unrestrained utilization eventually led insurance companies to raise annual private-
sector employer health insurance premiums in the late 1990s by double-digits annually 
(Titlow & Emanuel, 1999). Though managed care was formally promoted in the 1970s 
as a cost-effective alternative to FFS health insurance through the passage of the HMO 
Act of 1974 (Noble & Brennan, 1999), managed care plans were relatively rare 
compared to traditional FFS insurance until the mid-1990s when more than one-third of 
people with private health insurance belonged to an HMO (Zuvekas & Hill, 2004). By 
then, annual employer premiums for health care had grown drastically and some 
employers turned to managed care to cut costs. As of 1996, only 27% of eligible 
employees participated in traditional employer-sponsored FFS insurance plans (Shi & 
Singh, 2014).  
Definitions for managed care differ, but the general concept is an integration of 
the four major aspects of the health care system: financing, insurance, delivery, and 
payment (Shi & Singh, 2014). In the strictest form of managed care, health care 
providers are salaried employees of a managed care organization (MCO). In this MCO 
“staff” model of care, the salaries eliminate the incentive for provider-induced demand 
because provider compensation is not related to the volume of care delivered. Instead, 
these providers follow care guidelines established by the MCO that often relied on 
utilization restrictions to keep costs low (Kemper, Tu, Reschovsky, & Schaefer, 2002). 
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Providers can also contract with an MCO directly or as part of an independent provider 
association (IPA). These providers are reimbursed either through capitation or 
discounted fees. With capitation, a provider receives a fixed monthly payment from the 
MCO for each enrollee that designates the provider as his/her PCP. Capitation helps 
MCOs control its share of the costs by shifting financial risk to providers by making them 
responsible for the total cost of each member’s care in exchange for a fixed monthly 
payment. The advantage to providers for contracting with the MCO is the guaranteed 
income from supply of enrollees, since PCPs are paid the same capitation payment 
regardless of whether the enrollee receives care. With capitation, providers also have 
an incentive to keep costs low to cover unexpectedly high-cost patients and because 
any money left over annually is paid out to the providers (Zuvekas & Hill, 2004).  
In practice, over half of providers who contracted with MCOs in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s were reimbursed using a discounted fee schedule agreement (Zuvekas 
& Cohen, 2010). This means for each service or procedure provided to patients, 
providers were paid a previously-negotiated amount from the MCO, similar to FFS 
insurance. However, with managed care, not all health care services were covered, 
some services required preauthorization by the MCO, and enrollees were required to 
see only providers in the MCO network. These MCO policies served to keep costs down 
for MCOs and restrict utilization without the explicit control found in the MCO staff 
model. Most managed care plans also required that a single provider be responsible for 
coordinating an enrollee’s care, called a primary care physician (PCP) or gatekeeper. 
Research has shown that patients with chronic conditions whose care is coordinated 
through a gatekeeper often have better clinical outcomes and lower costs (Smith, 2003). 
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Many programs used today to curb spending on high-cost patients utilize gatekeeping, 
such as patient-centered medical homes, acknowledging the method’s effectiveness for 
controlling costs and potentially increasing quality (Cromwell, Trisolini, Pope, Mitchell, & 
Greenwald, 2011). 
The four major aspects of health care (financing, insurance, delivery, and 
payment) were largely separated for people with FFS insurance in the late 1990s, unlike 
with managed care. There was no formal mechanism like gatekeeping to coordinate 
care for patients who required intensive health care services since patients chose where 
and when to receive care themselves. Disjointed care often resulted in unnecessarily 
high costs and poor quality of care in these cases (Baldwin, 2001). Additionally, MCO 
enrollees often paid nothing or very little for preventative care services received from 
their PCP, unlike people with FFS insurance. Emphasis was given to preventative care 
because it has shown to prevent more expensive services in the long run, such as high-
cost inpatient hospital stays (Zhan, Miller, Wong, & Meyer, 2004). Past research has 
found MCO enrollees are often satisfied with the cost of their care, more so than people 
with FFS insurance (Pifer et al., 2003).  
Managed care backlash.  
The cost-driven aspect of managed care is believed to have undermined patient 
confidence in providers, eventually leading to a backlash against managed care 
beginning in the mid-1990s (Baker & McClellan, 2001). In particular, patients worried 
about the effect of restricting utilization on quality of care. Managed care organizations 
required providers to undergo extensive utilization reviews and negotiated with them 
directly on prices and coverage to reduce costs (Rodwin, 1997). Providers in MCO 
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networks were sometimes offered incentives for restricting utilization, such as year-end 
bonuses for keeping costs below a pre-determined amount (Grumbach, Osmond, 
Vranizan, Jaffe, & Bindman, 1998). Although anecdotal evidence showed some patients 
were negatively impacted from not receiving necessary care, a review found MCO 
enrollees on average did not receive lower quality of care and preventative care was 
often better (Miller & Luft, 2002; Zuvekas & Hill, 2004). Nonetheless, the perception that 
managed care was inferior to FFS insurance pervaded public and media sentiment 
(Noble & Brennan, 1997).  
Two major factors appeared to perpetuate the extent of the managed care 
backlash. First, providers became openly hostile to the utilization restrictions imposed 
by MCOs, convincing patients that their decision-making process was being interfered 
with (Shi & Singh, 2014). Second, the shift to managed care was driven almost entirely 
by employers responding to increases in health insurance premiums. Since employees 
were mostly shielded from the cost of insurance in the past, the savings for employers 
from reduced premiums went mostly unnoticed by employees (Blendon, Brodie, 
Benson, & Altman, 1998). Instead, employees perceived their health care plan choices 
were being scaled back with no accompanying reduction in their share of the costs. The 
issue of limited choice of plans was especially relevant for employees in firms that only 
offered a single health insurance option or in areas with few managed care providers.  
While some studies demonstrated negative outcomes for managed care patients 
relative to FFS patients regarding access to specialty services (Van Voorhees, Wang, & 
Ford, 2003) and satisfaction with care (Miller & Luft, 1997), other studies showed a lack 
of public understanding about MCOs drove much of the backlash (Bernard & Shulkin, 
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1998; Wilensky, 1999). One study found that people with FFS insurance were much 
more likely to rate MCOs as low-quality compared to ratings from actual MCO patients 
(Kahana et al., 2004). In the same survey, respondents were asked to name 
advantages of having managed care—MCO enrollees overwhelmingly chose lower 
costs, while those with FFS were not able to think of a single advantage. The strong 
negative perception of managed care was therefore not always a matter of personal 
experience.  
Emphasizing preventative care and gatekeeping were relatively new concepts to 
many people in the early 1990s. The FFS system was never intended to provide 
comprehensive health care services and care management that MCOs offer, instead it 
was designed for the treatment of illness and injury. Despite the enhanced access to 
preventative services from MCOs, the idea of restricting patient and provider choices 
was often considered unacceptable to people with traditional insurance (White, 1999). 
Pervasive negative media attention highlighted denial of care horror stories for certain 
managed care enrollees, further fueling the perception that managed care was 
synonymous with poor-quality care (Bernard & Shulkin, 1998).  
In general, the managed care backlash is linked to the perception that strict 
utilization rules were motivated entirely by cost containment goals, without considering 
the quality of care being delivered (Baker & McClellan, 2001). As such, many states 
began passing regulations that directly sought to weaken these rules for MCOs and 
ensure access to services for their enrollees (Zelman, 1999). Although health care has 
long been a heavily-regulated sector, the anti-managed care regulations were distinctive 
in their scope and magnitude. All states passed at least one law characterized as a 
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“managed care backlash” law by the National Council of State Legislators (NCSL), and 
many states passed dozens of these laws (Blendon et al., 1998). In general, the 
regulations sought to ensure MCOs treat their enrollees more similar to that of FFS 
patients. The content of each state’s managed care backlash regulations is unique, 
though the laws are often grouped into three categories: access to services, right to 
appeals, and provider flexibility (Pinkovskiy, 2014; NCSL, 2011). A number of laws 
specifically curtailed the PCP gatekeeper requirement. States also passed laws allowing 
women with managed care to have direct access to OB/GYNs and requiring that MCOs 
cover care provided in the Emergency Department. Regulations relating to appeals 
addressed liability issues, such as allowing patients to sue health plans for damages 
and requiring external reviews of appeals (Hurley & Draper, 2002). Finally, provider 
flexibility regulations dealt with constraints on treatment options imposed by MCOs. 
These laws included banning provider financial incentives to reduce utilization and 
banning provider “gag” clauses that prohibited providers from informing patients of 
alternative high-cost treatment options that the MCO did not want to reimburse.   
Patient-reported outcomes.  
 The regulatory backlash against managed care coincided with a growing 
movement toward more patient-centered health care (Institute of Medicine, 2001). 
Whether patients are receiving patient-centered care, which focuses on providing care 
to patients in a respectful and responsive manner, requires collection of patient-reported 
outcomes (PROs). Patient-reported outcomes describe non-clinical outcomes reported 
directly by patients, such as satisfaction with care, which provide a more comprehensive 
picture of the patient experience and quality of care than is available using solely clinical 
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information (Cella et al., 2010). Patient perceptions of health care quality are important 
for providers because PROs are often correlated with other favorable health outcomes. 
Patients who are satisfied with their care are more likely to stay with their primary care 
providers and to adhere to treatments (Safran, Montgomery, Chang, Murphy, & Rogers, 
2001; Zolnierek & Dimatteo, 2009). A study on heart attack patients showed that people 
who reported higher satisfaction with their care not only adhered to guidelines more 
frequently, but also had lower rates of inpatient mortality (Glickman et al., 2010). 
Additionally, patients who have confidence in their primary care providers are more 
likely to have better medication management and to engage in behaviors associated 
with other favorable clinical outcomes (Street, Makoul, Arora, & Epstein, 2009).  
Patient-reported outcomes are not universally embraced as legitimate measures 
of health care quality (Kane, 2006). The link between clinical outcomes, such as 
mortality and morbidity, and PROs varies. Although research suggests positive clinical 
outcomes are linked to PROs such as satisfaction with care (Gotay, Kawamoto, 
Bottomley, & Efficace, 2008; Glickman et al., 2010), other studies have found no 
significant relationship between the two outcome types (Sequist et al., 2008; Chang et 
al., 2006). One study suggested patient satisfaction is linked to providers meeting 
patient expectations, even if that means a patient receives services with no medical 
benefit (Fenton, Jerant, Bertakis, & Franks, 2012).  
Study Objectives 
To understand if regulation is an effective strategy, policymakers must know 
whether past regulation achieved their goals. Hundreds of regulations were passed in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s to ensure access to care and quality for managed care 
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enrollees, but limited research exists on whether the regulations led to those intended 
outcomes. The scant research available often focuses on a single regulation, thereby 
explaining only part of the managed care backlash effect.  This analysis studies all 
categories of backlash regulations to obtain a more complete understanding of the 
backlash and their impact on patient outcomes. States are categorized by backlash 
regulation intensity (number of regulations, plus stringency and rarity of regulations) to 
understand how variations in the types of regulations impacted patient outcomes. 
Therefore, the objective of this analysis is to determine whether states with a more 
intense regulatory backlash realized more gains in patient outcomes for its managed 
care enrollees relative to states with less intense backlash regulations.  
Analytical approach. 
 The concepts for this study are organized using Donabedian’s (1988) structure, 
process, outcomes (SPO) framework, which serves as a common foundation for health 
care quality research (Kane, 2006). The SPO framework provides a succinct outline for 
describing how managed care and the managed care regulations can impact patient 
outcomes and is well-suited for examining the research questions of this study. The 
structure dimension represents the fixed aspects of health care delivery, including 
environmental, organizational, and patient factors. Environmental factors are considered 
structural characteristics in this framework. While environmental factors are not explicitly 
included in the original SPO model, research often rectifies this weakness by including 
them as part of “Structure,” reflecting their potential to influence health care processes 
and outcomes, and their relatively fixed nature (Unruh & Wan, 2004). Environmental 
factors, such as where a patient lives and what problems a patient faces when 
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accessing health care services, have been associated with differing costs and quality of 
care (Hearld, Alexander, Fraser, & Jiang, 2008; Ly, Lopez, Isaac, & Jha, 2010). 
Regulatory environment, including managed care backlash regulations, is another 
environmental factor included in the Structure dimension.  
The process dimension in the SPO framework encompasses the activities of 
health care professionals when delivering care to patients, including diagnosing, making 
recommendations, and implementing treatment (Donabedian, 1988). Managed care 
uses a process called gatekeeping to influence how care is coordinated. Coordination of 
care for managed care enrollees entails having a single point of contact (PCP) to 
diagnose and treat all medical problems, and to refer patients for specialty services 
when needed. Gatekeeping can also influence the treatments patients receive. 
Managed care patients may receive relatively fewer services than FFS patients because 
MCOs limit the number and type of services they reimburse (Davidoff, Hill, Courtot, & 
Adams, 2007). Therefore, due to gatekeeping, managed care patients experience 
different care processes than FFS patients when they interact with health care 
professionals. 
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) provides information for the 
three PROs in this analysis, patient satisfaction with care, confidence in provider, and 
access to care. The MEPS is a representative two-year overlapping panel survey of 
health care utilization and cost for non-institutionalized persons in the U.S., with an 
annual sample size of around 30,000 people. It also includes information on insurance 
status (including managed care enrollment) and demographics, including age, gender, 
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and income. Mortality can be determined by linking the MEPS data to the National 
Death Index.  
 A difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach is used to address each 
research question. Using a DDD model, differences in patient outcomes between 
managed care and FFS patients are compared over time as states enacted their 
managed care regulations. Specifically, this study investigates the difference in 
outcomes for managed care patients in states with an intense regulatory backlash 
relative to managed care patients in states with a moderate or mild backlash. This 
model controls for changes in quality that potentially affected both types of patients over 
the period, such as the adoption of electronic health records. The reference year in this 
study is 1996. Most of the managed care regulations were passed between 1996-2000 
and were usually implemented within a few months of being passed. Years 2000 and 
2004 are considered as “post” periods. Studying quadrennial independent cross-
sections allows an analysis the regulatory effects bearing in mind the different timing of 
regulation adoption. 
It is unclear whether the state managed care backlash regulations passed in the 
1990s actually improved patient outcomes. However, there is some evidence that the 
managed care backlash regulations were responsible for much of the increase in health 
care spending growth in the early 2000s (Pinkovskiy, 2014). This study contributes to 
our understanding of governmental policy to manage health care by answering what 
impact the regulatory backlash had on quality of care for managed care enrollees.  
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Conclusion. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, MCOs pursued cost savings by implementing strict 
utilization rules and limiting provider networks (Rodwin, 1997). A backlash against 
managed care arose from the perception that quality of care was suffering due to the 
cost-driven decisions of MCOs (Goldberg, 1999). As part of this backlash, states 
passed laws regulating MCOs, eventually leading to hundreds of regulations by the mid-
2000s mandating changes for these companies (Pinkovskiy, 2014). The central goal of 
the backlash regulations was to ensure patients received good quality of care (Zelman, 
1999). To investigate whether this goal was achieved, this study takes advantage of the 
differing levels of regulatory intensity to investigate the impact of these laws on quality 
of care for managed care enrollees. The next chapter presents a literature review of 
past research relevant to quality of care for managed care enrollees and to the 
managed care backlash and regulations.  Following the literature review, the conceptual 
framework used to guide this analysis is presented. The methodology is then discussed, 
followed by a presentation of the empirical analysis results. The final chapter discusses 
the major lessons learned and ends with a brief discussion of future research.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
 
Quality of care for managed care enrollees has been a topic of interest since 
managed care was promoted as a cost-effective alternative to traditional health 
insurance in the 1970s (Miller & Luft, 1994). However, managed care enrollment was 
relatively low compared to traditional fee-for-service (FFS) insurance until the mid-
1990s. By that point, double-digit increases in employer health care insurance premium 
rates led many private employers to turn to managed care to save money (Enthoven, 
Schauffler, & McMenamin, 2001). Since cost savings were often sought by restricting 
utilization, providers and patients worried about the effect of managed care on quality of 
care and patient outcomes. Research on health care quality for managed care enrollees 
through the 1990s found that clinical quality was essentially equivalent between people 
with managed care and FFS, though managed care patients often described relatively 
worse patient-reported outcomes (Miller & Luft, 2002). In particular, managed care 
enrollees reported relatively lower satisfaction and more problems accessing health 
care services (Miller & Luft, 1997; Phillips, Mayer, & Aday, 2000). This study extends 
past research by analyzing patient outcomes for FFS and managed care enrollees in 
the context of the volatile regulatory environment of the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
referred to as the “managed care backlash” era. Therefore, this literature review begins 
with a synthesis of research on the managed care backlash and state regulations. This 
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provides insight into the motivation behind the backlash and provides a framework for 
understanding the other area of this review, quality of care for managed care enrollees.  
This chapter begins with a description of the literature review search, followed by 
a synthesis of the research and an integration of the literature. The final section explains 
how the concepts learned from this review will help inform the theoretical and empirical 
models of this study, presented in the subsequent two chapters.   
Literature Review Search     
This review was conducted using concepts from the systematic literature review 
process.  Petticrew and Roberts (2008) describe systematic reviews as, “[L]iterature 
reviews that adhere closely to a set of scientific methods that explicitly aim to limit 
systematic error (bias), mainly by attempting to identify, appraise and synthesize all 
relevant studies (of whatever design)” (p.9). This approach helps to provide a 
comprehensive and complete search of past literature, and better informs the theoretical 
framework of this study. PubMED/MEDLINE and Web of Science (excluding MEDLINE) 
search engines were used to investigate the two themes: the managed care backlash 
and quality of care. The search for Theme 1 contained the keywords: “managed care” or 
“health maintenance organization” and regulation or backlash. For Theme 2, “managed 
care” or “health maintenance organization” and quality and access or confidence or 
satisfaction or mortality or “health status.” Including the outcome variables narrowed the 
results to papers relevant to the scope of this study. Keywords were searched across 
titles and abstracts in PubMED and across topics in Web of Science. All articles and 
books published in English, with human subjects, and with the U.S. as the setting were 
included in the search. Theme 2 (quality of managed care) was restricted to July 2001-
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forward, owing to Miller and Luft’s (2004) earlier literature review covering the same 
topic. No year restriction was given to the Theme 1 (managed care backlash and 
regulations).  
Search results. 
Though many of the studies were published after the main backlash era (2004+), 
the data used in the papers were often from the 1990s and early 2000s. The empirical 
analyses range from case studies of patients transitioning to managed care from FFS 
over time (usually Medicaid), to more straightforward comparisons of outcomes for 
managed care (MCO) versus FFS patients. Cross-sectional analyses and papers with 
only MCO enrollees were excluded. The exclusion criteria for Theme 1 was not as 
stringent, since the goal was to provide context and background for the backlash. A 
handful of additional papers were added from citations from the chosen articles. In the 
end, 105 articles were included in the literature review, split almost evenly between the 
two themes. Surprisingly few papers overlapped across both themes, highlighting the 
need for research that integrates these areas. 
A number of unique trends emerged from the selected papers. Research for 
Theme 1 is grouped into four broad subthemes: understanding the backlash, provider 
sentiment towards managed care, consumerism in health care, and redefining managed 
care. Research for Theme 2, which is comprised solely of empirical analyses, is 
grouped into three subthemes. The first subtheme specifically explores research on 
health care quality for managed care enrollees, following in the footsteps of Miller and 
Luft. The second subtheme examines the value and validity of using patient-reported 
outcomes in health care quality research. Although this area of research was not 
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specifically targeted for investigation, the amount of research on the topic and its 
relevance to this study warranted its own subtheme. The last collection of papers 
describe empirical research related to quality of managed care that did not fit into the 
first two themes, including papers related to cost of care and rationing of care.  
Synthesis of Previous Work 
Theme 1. Managed care backlash and regulations. 
Theme 1 provides a general overview of the managed care backlash and 
regulations. Fifty-two papers are discussed, about half of which are devoted to the first 
subtheme, understanding the motivation and nature of the backlash. The second 
subtheme describes provider opinion of managed care, most of which turned out to be 
negative. Next, the role of health care consumerism in perpetuating the backlash is 
discussed. The final subtheme summarizes the evolution of managed care since the 
backlash and regulations were passed.  
Theme 1a. Understanding the managed care backlash. 
While health insurance has been regulated since the mid-20th century, state 
regulations became pervasive beginning in the 1970s (Gray, Lowery, & Godwin, 2007). 
Many states began passing mandated benefit laws in the 1980s that required insurance 
companies to cover specific people or services, laws that applied to all private insurance 
companies (Laugesen, et al., 2006). By the 1990s, two mandates were eventually 
adopted in all states: mandatory minimums for maternity stays and a requirement for 
breast reconstruction surgery after a mastectomy (also federally mandated). These 
mandated benefits laws paved the way for laws regulating managed care. Specifically, 
in the 1990s, states began passing laws particular to MCOs. While many of these laws 
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are essentially mandated benefit laws, others included allowing patients to sue 
insurance companies and many broad “patient protection” laws.  In general, the laws 
were labeled backlash or anti-managed care regulations (Pinkovskiy, 2014; NCSL, 
2011). Papers written after the backlash often characterize the end of the backlash as 
2003-2004, once states finished passing backlash regulations (Pinkovskiy, 2014; Sloan, 
Rattliff, & Hall, 2005). 
The backlash regulations were characterized by economists as a response to 
market failures (Sloan & Hall, 2002). This argument suggests laws are necessary to 
protect enrollees from predatory insurance companies that do not provide adequate 
coverage. In this way, legislation was seen by some as necessary. Bolin, Buchanan, 
and Smith (2003) described the laws as a response, in part, to preserving the patient-
provider relationship and enhancing access to care. Hurley and Draper (2002) 
suggested legislation proved useful for encouraging insurer accountability for consumer 
choice and access. Swartz and Brennan (1996), writing at the beginning of the 
backlash, described how financial arrangements between MCOs and providers 
incentivizes poor quality of care. They suggested government oversight and regulations 
as the ways to correct the tradeoff between cost and quality. 
Bernard and Shulkin (1998) found that negative media stories influenced public 
sentiment of MCOs, even though most of the people surveyed never had a negative 
experience with an MCO personally. Furthermore, Brodie, Brady, and Altman (1998) 
determined the media portrayal of MCOs by 1997 was mostly negative and anecdotal, 
contrasting with a generally neutral and factual tone of the media portrayal in the early 
1990s. Similarly, Hall (2004) found states with more stringent backlash laws were more 
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likely to experience copious amounts of negative media attention about MCOs. 
However, those same health plan administrators insisted the laws were primarily 
passed to ensure patients’ rights and to address provider interests. Mechanic (2001) 
suggested public anger at managed care was misplaced due to the disproportionately 
negative media attention, which prevented a discussion about better ways to deliver 
care. Rabinowitz (2010) found newspaper support for managed care laws was swayed 
by advertising campaigns. In general, many of the papers included in this subtheme 
referenced some external voice as a major source of the backlash.  
Teixeira (2000) argued the backlash reflected the sentiment of the public, who 
were described as being satisfied with their care, but worried about what the future held 
if MCOs and cost-cutting proliferated. Noble and Brennan (1999) list consumer 
dissatisfaction with care as a key reason for backlash legislation. Many people resented 
the idea of MCOs restricting their choice of doctor or the types of services they 
received, even if quality of care was essentially equivalent for MCO and FFS enrollees 
(Kahana et al., 2004). Interference by MCOs into treatment decisions was sometimes 
seen as an impediment to patient confidence and trust in providers (Baker & McClellan, 
2001). However, Gawande et al. (1998) found that people without a choice of health 
plan had the same level of satisfaction with care as people with managed care plans, 
suggesting the dissatisfaction with MCOs was more about the perception of restricted 
choice than managed care itself. Kemper et al. (2002) found that more restrictive MCOs 
had relatively lower scores on patient satisfaction and trust in provider than people with 
FFS. Blendon et al. (1998) specified two reasons for the backlash: a significant 
proportion of Americans reported having issues with MCOs, and people were scared 
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MCOs would not take care of them if they got sick. One article suggested the backlash 
was partially caused by consumer ignorance of the true cost of health care (Thompson 
& Cutler, 2010).  
Many articles suggested the regulations could result in unintended negative 
consequences. Balla (1999) argued the regulations would prevent HMO development 
and thereby raise overall costs. Mays, Hurley, and Grossman (2003) predicted 
employer costs would increase once the MCO utilization constraints were lifted and 
provider networks were opened. Relaxing MCO restrictions on prescription drug 
utilization was also predicted to increase share of health care expenditures attributable 
to drugs (Bolin et al., 2002). Brown and Hartung (1998) predicted the regulation of 
health insurance would eventually lead to most plans looking like PPOs. Hurley and 
Draper (2002) suggested additional laws would increase health care costs directly 
(MCOs need to hire more lawyers, pay for more things, pass those costs to consumers), 
driving up costs by preventing the cost-saving mechanisms of MCOs. As explained in 
the last subtheme of Theme 1, many of the predictions proved to be accurate. 
Theme 1b. Provider sentiment towards managed care. 
This subtheme reviews papers related specifically to provider sentiments towards 
managed care. These studies usually described how provider behaviors or practices 
changed as a result of MCO practices, and if providers thought managed care 
negatively impacted patient outcomes. Beach, Meredith, Halpern, Wells, and Ford 
(2005) found in a survey of almost 900 physicians that providers in more restrictive 
MCO models felt less responsibility for their patients compared to physicians in less 
restrictive MCO arrangements. Ettner et al. (2006) found outcomes for diabetes patients 
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were better when physicians were paid a salary instead of FFS or capitation, though 
positive outcomes were dependent on how each organization was structured. Van 
Voorhees et al. (2003) found physicians with the largest percentage of MCO patients 
were more likely to report issues that prevented them from providing high-quality care. 
Provider attitudes about managed care evolved since the 1970s, especially 
relating to provider satisfaction. Using an early survey, Lum (1975) found physician 
attitudes about HMOs were favorable on the whole, specifically surrounding prepayment 
and quality of care. By the late 1990s, MacDermid et al. (2002) found provider concern 
over reimbursement led to decreased provider satisfaction. However, another paper 
found MCOs did not impact the relationship between provider satisfaction and patient-
reported quality (Grembowski, Patrick, Williams, Diehr, & Martin, 2005). The authors 
found many physicians did not believe MCOs impacted how they delivered care. Those 
same providers reported negative feelings toward the degree of regulation. Likewise, 
Landon et al. (2002) found job dissatisfaction increased markedly among physicians in 
Massachusetts between 1996 and 1999, driven by perceived external influence on 
practice decisions. Misra, Modawal, and Panigrahi (2009) researched experiences of 
Asian-Indian physicians and found those serving the lowest percentage of MCO 
patients had the highest satisfaction scores. Tietze and Sinha (2003) found perceptions 
of managed care were higher for health administrators than physicians in areas with a 
high managed care penetration.  
A couple of papers written after the backlash provide perspective on whether the 
regulations changed provider sentiment of managed care. Kronebusch, Schlesinger, 
and Thomas (2009) found physicians reported their autonomy was less constrained due 
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to certain backlash regulations. Likewise, Hargraves and Pham (2003) found specialists 
reported more freedom to provide patients with necessary, but found no change in the 
percentage of PCPs reporting independence in their clinical decision-making. The 
authors suggest the enhanced feelings of freedom by specialists were due to relaxed 
constraints from MCOs, likely due to the backlash. The studies in this subtheme 
emphasize that provider sentiment towards managed care was mostly negative by the 
mid-1990s and throughout the era of the backlash. 
Theme 1c. Consumerism in health care. 
            The third subtheme describes managed care and the subsequent backlash in 
terms of the growing importance of consumerism in health care. Consumer-driven 
health care describes the desire for more individual control over health care choices 
(Robinson & Ginsburg, 2009). As alluded to in Theme 1a, a number of papers 
characterized the backlash as a response to patient choices being limited. However, 
Enthoven et al. (2001) found that satisfaction with health insurance plans was more 
likely to be correlated with the number of choices available to an employee, regardless 
of whether plans were FFS or managed care. The authors suggest managed care 
thrived in many areas before the backlash and dissatisfaction was related to the move 
by many employers to offer only one insurance option in the 1990s, many of which were 
MCOs. A study on HMO market penetration trends by Marquis, Rogowski, and Escarce 
(2004) lends supports to this claim. Specifically, the authors found people in managed 
care plans tended to be satisfied with their care overall and chose to remain enrolled 
with the MCO even when a FFS option was available. 
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The consensus from many health care consumerism articles was patient choice 
of health care plans and providers constitute an important part of patient expectations 
and satisfaction with care. Barry and Ridgely (2008) found the provision of mental 
health services by MCOs was expanded in response to increased coverage by FFS 
insurance. And Tai-Seale and Pescosolido (2003) found the ability to choose providers 
was significantly related to positive patient opinion of their physician. The authors 
argued that enhancing consumer choice could improve public sentiment of health care if 
it translated into increased patient satisfaction.  
Theme 1d. Regulations and the evolution of managed care.  
 The final subtheme discusses the evolving concepts of managed care and how 
the backlash and regulations changed MCOs over time. Miller (2006) found managed 
care and gatekeeping encouraged efficiency in the health care sector by preventing 
people from “doctor shopping,” which resulted in extraneous spending from 
unnecessary procedures and medications. Sekhri (2000) suggested managed care 
positively transformed the US healthcare system in the 1990s by lowering costs and 
emphasizing preventative care. Musser (1997) noted that although early versions of 
physician-run MCOs often ran into issues cutting costs and instituting mechanisms for 
quality control, with time other MCO models proved to be more effective as MCOs 
relented on utilization constraints. Simon, White, Gamliel, and Kletke (1997) describe 
the impact of managed care on scope of practice and the provision of primary care 
services. They found that specialists were spending less time on primary care and 
PCPs were spending more time on primary care as managed care penetration 
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increased, which they suggested would create efficiencies and potentially better quality 
of care.  
The backlash caused significant changes in health plan approaches for 
controlling utilization while maintaining quality, according to interviews with insurance 
administrators (Felt-Lisk & Mays, 2002). Gatekeeping began to focus on improving 
disease management, especially for people with certain chronic conditions (Felt-Lisk & 
Mays, 2002). Mays and Claxton (2007) provide empirical evidence that disease 
management programs offered by insurance companies increased post-backlash, while 
Fang, Liu, and Rizzo (2009) find that gatekeeping did not diminish after the backlash. 
Less restrictive forms of managed care began flourishing in the mid-1990s, especially 
preferred provider organizations (PPOs) (Shi & Singh, 2014). National data on employer 
insurance coverage showed PPOs accounted for about one third of insurance coverage 
for private employees in 1997, but covered the majority of employees by 2003 (Cooper, 
Simon, & Vistnes, 2006). As with an HMO, a PPO utilizes a network of providers and 
pays using discounted fees, but patients can go outside of the network in exchange for 
paying a higher share of the cost. Hirth, Grazier, Chernew, and Okeke (2007) found that 
when employees at the University of Michigan were first offered a PPO, people with 
FFS insurance were more likely to switch to the PPO versus HMO enrollees. The 
authors argue this is because HMO enrollees were satisfied with their care and the 
negative sentiment regarding managed care was not a major deterrent for the FFS 
enrollees that switched.  
Noble and Brennan (1999) suggest the variation in state regulations eventually 
converged towards a shared view of what managed care should look like. Mays (2004) 
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found many MCOs in the mid-2000s reintroduced many of the strategies criticized 
during the backlash after costs rapidly increased, like requiring prior authorization 
Konetzka, Zhu, Sochalski, and Volpp (2008) found high managed care penetration 
stopped serving as an indicator of relatively lower cost growth by 2001, arguing the 
effects of managed care on lowering hospital costs were diminished post-backlash. In 
general, these studies found the backlash forced MCOs to change many of their most 
restrictive practices, such as gag orders and financial incentives to providers, even 
though these were the same strategies that were most effective at constraining health 
care spending.   
Theme 1. Summary. 
Theme 1 describes the motivation for the managed care backlash, including how 
provider sentiment towards managed care changed over time, increasing health care 
consumerism in the 1990s, and the general evolution of managed care. Research found 
the backlash regulations stemmed partly from genuine concerns over quality of care for 
managed care enrollees, especially the three key outcome variables in this study: 
access to care, patient satisfaction, and confidence in providers. However, research 
also shows biased media coverage, increasingly limited options of employer-sponsored 
health insurance, and negative provider sentiment towards MCOs also contributed to 
the public outcry that led to many of the regulations. Although the backlash changed 
certain aspects of managed care, other aspects remained the same (emphasis on 
preventative care) or were eventually reintroduced (financial incentives). In fact, 
enrollment in managed care increased since the backlash, but mostly to less restrictive 
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PPO plans. Theme 2 discusses research on managed care quality during the height of 
the backlash and beyond.  
Theme 2. Quality of managed care. 
The 2002 literature review by Miller and Luft is the most current synthesis of the 
research on quality of care for managed care enrollees. In general, they found managed 
care enrollees did not show significantly different outcomes compared with FFS 
enrollees. In some ways, they found quality was better for managed care enrollees, 
such as with preventative care. However, quality was usually worse when comparing 
access to care and certain aspects of satisfaction with care. The papers included in their 
review were often from the period before the backlash had completely taken hold (pre-
2000). The first subtheme in Theme 2 provides an update to this research, reviewing 
empirical research on quality of care for managed care enrollees from 2001-forward, 
when Miller and Luft’s last review left off. The second subtheme in Theme 2 reviews the 
value and validity of using patient-reported outcomes (PROs) in health care quality 
research. Although some of these articles do not directly relate to managed care 
enrollees, they provide background and context for the PRO measures used in this 
study. The last section describes the empirical papers that did not fit with the other 
subthemes. 
Theme 2a. Quality of care for managed care enrollees. 
Empirical analyses of quality of care for managed care enrollees are discussed in 
this subtheme. A similar coding scheme as the one developed by Miller and Luft (2002) 
is used to organize the results of the studies identified in the literature search. Studies 
were categorized as showing either positive results towards managed care enrollees, 
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negative towards managed care enrollees, no difference versus the comparison group, 
or having mixed results. In most cases, the analyses compared quality between 
managed care and FFS beneficiaries, especially for private and Medicare analyses. 
Other studies were panel analyses of patients transitioning from FFS to managed care, 
usually single-state Medicaid analyses. Many papers used managed care penetration 
as the key independent variable, but some used medical claims and surveys to gather 
individual information about patients.   
Forty empirical papers were reviewed, 23 of which related only to Medicare or 
Medicaid managed care patients (Table 1). The patient outcomes analyzed in these 
papers generally correspond to those used in past research on MCO quality, specifically 
access to care and satisfaction with care. The studies from post-backlash did not 
consistently have better or worse outcomes. Of the 40 papers, 14 found MCO enrollees 
to have relatively better outcomes, while most showed mixed, negative, or no difference 
in outcomes. Studies that included private MCO enrollees were more likely to show 
positive MCO results (7/16) than studies with only Medicare and Medicaid patients 
(7/23). Five of the 9 studies with negative MCO results related solely to public managed 
care. Mixed results were also more likely to be related to Medicare and Medicaid. While 
most of the data used in these studies were from during the backlash, a few were from 
the mid- to late-2000s.  
While the anti-managed care regulations apply to private MCOs in each state, 
MCOs that contract with Medicare and Medicaid are mostly exempt (“mostly” because 
preemption of federal regulations was challenged by some states). However, Pinkovskiy 
(2014) suggests public MCOs likely experienced significant spillover from the backlash   
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Table 1 
Summary of Empirical Findings for Quality of Care for Managed Care Enrollees, Studies 
Published between 2001 and 2016 
Finding 
Number 
of Studies 
Medicare 
or 
Medicaid 
MCO  
MCO only 
(transition 
to or from 
FFS) 
Studies, by First Author and Year 
of Publication 
Positive, 
MCO 
14 7 4 
Berman 2005, Blanc 2003, Daley 
2005, Garrett 2005, 
Gowrisankaran 2003, Jiang 2013, 
Kane 2004, Luft 2003, Mitchell 
2004, Nicholas 2013, Paul 2013, 
Rogowski 2007, Roohan 2006, 
Zhan 2004 
Negative, 
MCO 
9 5 2 
Aizer 2007, Dwyer 2012, 
Garwood 2008, Haile 2002, Kerr 
2004, Lopez de Fete 2010, Porell 
2001, Thompson 2003, Xu 2007 
Same or 
No 
Difference 
8 3 0 
Backus 2001, Bian 2006, Chen 
2010, Keyes 2001, Kim 2007, 
Mark 2005, Porell 2001, Pracht 
2011 
Mixed 8 6 6 
Fox 2003, Hewner 2016, Kahana 
2004, Kane 2005, Laditka 2000, 
Safran 2002, Skinner 2007, 
Slutsman 2002, Smith 2005 
Total 40 24 12  
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regulations, such that MCOs offering public or private coverage operated under similar 
guidelines. Regardless, these results suggest the distinction between private and public 
managed care is important to consider when studying patient outcomes. 
 Patients tended to be satisfied with their overall care, regardless of their 
insurance coverage. This finding is consistent with what Miller and Luft (1997 & 2002) 
found in their earlier reviews. Many of the mixed results related to access to care, 
usually specific to public MCO patients or to accessing services from specialists. 
Mortality and confidence in provider were not as commonly-studied as satisfaction and 
access, though a few papers reported significant findings. Dwyer, Liu, and Rizzo (2012) 
studied whether HMO and FFS patients reported a difference in how much they trust 
their physicians, defined as having confidence in the provider. Using a survey from 
2001, the authors found HMO patients had relatively less trust in their providers which 
the authors equated with lower quality of care.  
The overall findings of this subtheme are similar to Miller and Luft (2002) in that 
the results are mostly mixed. While there are many cases of positive results for MCO 
enrollees, there are more cases of negative and mixed results. Though MCO enrollees 
were still found to have issues with access to care, especially specialty services, overall 
satisfaction was found to be generally high for all patients. Additionally, whether the 
studies examined private or public managed care appeared to be an important 
mediating factor in the results, with public managed care patient having worse patient 
outcomes more often than private managed care patients.  
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Theme 2b. The value and validity of patient-reported outcomes in health 
quality research. 
The second subtheme in Theme 2 focuses on the value and validity of using 
patient-reported outcomes (PROs) in health care quality research. Many of the articles 
describe quality of care as relating to a multitude of factors. Matchar et al. (2008) 
describes PROs as necessary to comprehensively measure quality of care for some 
patients, such as those with frequent and severe headaches. Schatz et al. (2005) find 
patient experience for asthma patients is comprised of important aspects usually not 
considered in traditional research, such as level of concern over access to medication. 
Bender and Garfinkel’s (2001) analysis of Medicare patients with MCO and FFS 
insurance identified three distinctive areas of patient-reported quality: provider 
communication, access to services, and plan administration. Ko and Coons (2005) 
described a myriad of quality of life concerns that impact older adults with common 
chronic conditions, such as functioning and wellbeing. Hazelhurst, McBurnie, Mularski, 
Puro, and Chauvie (2012) argue that measuring quality of care requires comprehensive 
information on patient services and health status, something MCOs are better equipped 
to handle because they already have standardized systems in place. Beckles et al. 
(2007) found patient self-reports of health care services often do not match their 
medical claims, suggesting physicians do not have access to accurate information on 
their patients, which could lead to lower quality of care. 
Certain patient experiences were found to correspond closely with perceptions of 
quality. Pifer et al. (2003) found mental quality of life for managed care patients was 
positively correlated with satisfaction with financial aspects of their coverage, but not 
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other clinical quality measures. Born and Query (2004) found that patient complaints 
against MCOs were often correlated with truly poor quality. And Price, Elliott, Cleary, 
Zaslavsky, and Hays (2014) found positive patient experiences were correlated with 
behaviors and decisions that resulted in better outcomes.  
A couple articles show that perceptions of quality can differ depending on the 
specific factor being studied. Newacheck et al. (2001) found that patients sometimes 
reported high overall satisfaction even if they also reported issues with access to care. 
Likewise, sick and healthy patients within the same health plan sometimes provided 
different responses about their health insurance (Zaslavsky & Cleary, 2002).  
           The impact of PROs on physician practice and behaviors was discussed in a 
number of papers. During the backlash, a high percentage (70%) of MCOs reported 
utilizing patient satisfaction surveys for substance and mental health services, even 
more than clinical outcomes assessments (49%) (Merrick, Garnick, Horgan, & Hodgkin, 
2002). From 1997 to 2001, physicians reported that patient satisfaction feedback had an 
increasingly significant impact on the way they practice (Strunk & Reschovsky, 2002). 
Likewise, Callahan, Fein, and Battleman (2002) found providers overwhelmingly 
reported that patient feedback useful, though only about half said it would influence their 
practice. Thompson, Ryan, Pinidiya, and Bost (2003) found MCOs that publicly divulged 
performance measures were more likely to be high-performing, though this could reflect 
correlation instead of causality. Huesch (2009) noted that MCOs may have difficulty 
measuring quality of providers when samples sizes are small, such as with cardiac 
surgeons, limiting the usefulness of PROs in these cases.   
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A few papers discussed PROs in context of the patient-centeredness movement. 
Frankel and Hourigan (2004) found focus groups were often useful to determine the true 
nature of patient satisfaction and to achieve “patient-centeredness.” Nutting et al. (2005) 
found primary care interventions were associated with higher rates of suicide detection 
in depressed patients, suggesting a more hands-on approach to care results in better 
outcomes. Similarly, home assessments were found to be correlated with better 
dementia caregiver outcomes, while a negative correlation was found when the 
caregiver was assigned to a community agency (Connor et al., 2008). The authors 
suggest the in-house, one-on-one interaction was important for realizing positive 
outcomes for both the dementia patient and the caregiver.    
Theme 2c. Assorted empirical research on managed care quality and cost.  
            The last section covers a few areas of research not covered in the other 
subthemes relating to managed care quality and the cost of care. A couple cost studies 
highlight the benefits of managed care. Bloom et al. (2002) found that cost of care for 
the mentally ill in Colorado was relatively lower in Medicaid managed care areas than in 
areas with mostly FFS Medicaid. And Goetghebeur, Forrest, and Hay (2003) attributed 
rises in inpatient hospital costs to loosening utilization restrictions by MCOs. However, 
other papers found managed care was not always the cheapest option. Buntin, Garber, 
McClellan, and Newhouse (2004) found Medicare MCOs kept costs relatively low by 
avoiding costly patients, specifically those who are terminally ill. McGuire, Newhouse, 
and Sinaiko (2011) found Medicare MCOs were paradoxically paid relatively higher 
payments for some services than FFS insurance. Additionally, Shenkman, Tian, 
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Nackashi, and Schatz (2005) found physicians paid mostly by MCOs were more likely to 
refer children to specialists versus physicians paid mostly with FFS insurance. 
A few papers describe the potential for managed care rationing and utilization 
restrictions to negatively affect patient outcomes. Ridgely, Giard, Shern, Mulkern, and 
Burnam (2002) found managed care impacted the process of substance abuse care 
delivery by restricting services, medications, and employment. Albrecht’s (2001) 
qualitative study on the experience of people with disabilities characterized their care as 
rationed and low-quality due to MCO restrictions on covered services. Likewise, MCO 
practices were found to negatively influence the treatment of substance abuse due to 
reduced patient autonomy (Ghose, 2008). Writing during the backlash, Fournier and 
McInnes (2002) surmised referrals required by many MCOs shielded the reputation of 
poor-performing doctors and perpetuated low quality. Studdert, Bhattacharya, 
Schoenbaum, Warren, and Escarce (2002) found physicians were half as likely to 
choose an MCO for their own insurance as non-physicians. The authors suggest this is 
due to physicians’ negative experience with MCO rationing in their practice. 
However, some papers found little difference in quality between MCO and FFS 
patients. Ma, Coleman, Fish, Lin, and Kramer (2004) found acute care elderly patients 
with FFS and MCO insurance were both as likely to receive fractured care 
(characterized by multiple transfers between health care settings). Additionally, one 
study found patient quality ratings for restrictive MCOs were essentially the same as the 
FFS control group, excepting pain patients who reported issues with access to specialty 
services (Grembowski et al., 2007). Willging, Waitzkin, and Wagner (2005) determined 
many of the preventative care services covered by MCOs were not accessible in rural 
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areas because of a lack of providers in the MCO network. These papers indicate 
managed care restrictions translated to unsatisfactory care for some segment of 
enrollees.    
 A few papers described managed care success stories and the need for more 
research comparing FFS insurance with managed care. Kyes, Wickizer, and Franklin 
(2003) found employer satisfaction with employee health care was higher with MCO 
plans than FFS insurance. A systematic review found managed care reduced 
emergency department utilization in 10 of 12 studies (Morgan, Chang, Alqatari, & Pines,  
2013). Mukamel, Weimer, Zwanziger, and Mushlin (2002) found evidence MCOs 
contracted with cardiac surgeons of relatively higher quality, as measured by mortality 
rates, because higher quality translated to fewer readmissions and less spending. One 
article described Medicaid managed care in North Carolina in largely positive terms 
because MCOs were subject to regulations and held accountable, unlike FFS insurance 
(Shipman, 2012). One paper on long-term care services identified the transition from 
FFS to managed care insurance as the most important topic in need of research in the 
field of long-term care (Kaye & Harrington, 2015).  
Theme 2. Summary. 
          Theme 2 reviews empirical research on quality of managed care from 2001-
forward. The empirical evidence remains mixed as to whether quality of care is relatively 
better or worse for managed care enrollees versus people with traditional FFS 
insurance. However, the research finds that access to specialty services, and services 
for people with special needs, continues to be a problem for managed care enrollees. 
Aside from studies covering traditional comparisons of MCO and FFS enrollees, papers 
 36 
describing the value and validity of using PROs in health care quality research emerged 
as a distinct area of research. These papers defined health care quality using a 
combination of factors that are often unmeasured or underutilized in practice, including 
incorporating patient reports of quality into care decisions. The final subtheme reviews 
various empirical research on managed care quality and cost of care. Many papers 
analyzed MCO costs and utilization, with mixed sentiment on their future in the post-
backlash era.    
Summary and Rationale for Formulating an Analytic Framework 
The managed care backlash dominated the health care discussion in the mid- 
and late-1990s. Patient protection was identified as the impetus behind many of the 
backlash regulations (Hall, 2004), though many other factors are identified in the 
literature as motivating and perpetuating the backlash. As Miller and Luft (2002) found 
in the early 2000s, and Theme 2 of this review confirms is still accurate, evidence 
shows that quality of care is not clearly better or worse for managed care enrollees. 
Nonetheless, states passed hundreds of anti-managed care regulations to water down 
or eliminate many of the strategies used by MCOs to reduce costs and streamline care. 
These same strategies are increasingly used in value-based and accountable care 
delivery models emanating from the ACA (Highfill & Ozcan, 2016).  
Despite the effort undertaken to pass the backlash regulations, limited research 
exists on whether the regulations ever achieved their intended outcome of enhancing 
quality of care for managed care patients. The few articles that did study the impact of 
the backlash regulations often focused on individual laws or used imprecise and 
unreliable data. Sloan et al.’s (2005) research on the backlash regulations is the most 
 37 
relevant study of the impact of these laws, but their analysis ends at 2001 and the 
authors admit the data used were not ideal for discerning effects. This study seeks to fill 
this gap by analyzing data better suited for analyzing patient outcomes and analyzing a 
longer time series. The themes described in this chapter are incorporated into the 
conceptual framework and hypotheses of this study, presented in the next chapter.    
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Chapter III: Conceptual Framework 
 
The managed care backlash regulations passed in the mid-1990s and early 
2000s sought to improve quality of care for managed care enrollees (Gray et al., 2007). 
Quality of care is comprised of multiple areas or domains of care, ranging from clinical 
outcomes, like mortality rates, to emotional well-being (Kane, 2006). The main 
outcomes of this study relate directly to the areas of care quality considered lacking for 
managed care enrollees during the backlash: access to care, confidence in provider, 
and patient satisfaction with care (Miller & Luft 1997, 2002; Baker & McClellan, 2001). 
The concepts for this study are organized using Donabedian’s structure, process, 
outcome (SPO) framework, which serves as a common foundation for health care 
quality research (Kane, 2006). The SPO framework describes how structural aspects of 
care effect the processes of care for patients, which in turn impact patient outcomes 
(Donabedian, 1980). Elements from economic theory are also incorporated into the 
framework to help explain the motivation and potential effects of the backlash 
regulations. 
Structure of Care 
In the SPO framework, structure describes fixed attributes of the health care 
setting, such as equipment, and organizational characteristics, such as methods of care 
reimbursement (Donabedian, 1988). Managed care is a structural factor because it 
effects how health care is organized for enrollees. Specifically, all health care services 
for managed care patients are arranged by a single provider, called a gatekeeper. This 
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differs from how care is delivered with traditional indemnity insurance, where patients 
visit the doctor of their choice.  
Patient and environmental characteristics are also included as structural 
components in the SPO framework. These characteristics represent fixed aspects of 
health care delivery that impact health care utilization and patient outcomes outside of 
organizational attributes of the care setting (Ridgley et al., 2002). Relevant patient 
characteristics include medical history, insurance coverage, health status, income, and 
basic demographic information (e.g., race, age). These characteristics have all been 
shown to impact patient-reported outcomes (PROs), including patient satisfaction and 
trust in provider (Ko & Coons, 2005; Grembowski et al., 2007; Pifer, 2003). 
Environmental factors include geography, such as where a patient lives and the barriers 
a patient faces when seeking health care services (Ly et al., 2010; Hearld et al., 2008). 
For example, the supply of providers is often lower for people living in a rural setting, 
making access to care more difficult than for people living in metropolitan areas (Chan, 
Hart, & Goodman, 2006). Environmental factors also include laws with the potential to 
impact health care, such as minimum nurse staffing ratios in hospitals and the managed 
care backlash regulations, the variable of interest in this study.  
Process of Care 
The process dimension of the SPO framework encompasses the activities of 
health care professionals and organizations when patients seek care. This involves 
diagnosing, making recommendations, and implementing treatment (Donabedian, 
1980). Processes of care for managed care enrollees differ from people with traditional 
insurance because of the gatekeeping requirement. The gatekeeper or primary care 
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physician (PCP) is responsible for coordinating all health care services for managed 
care patients. Coordination of care involves approving, scheduling, and monitoring all 
the health care services a patient receives (AHRQ, 2014). Patients with complicated 
health care requirements, such as people with chronic conditions, have been shown to 
have better clinical and financial outcomes when health care services are coordinated 
through a gatekeeper (Smith, 2003). Additionally, consistent interactions between a 
patient and provider can lead to enhanced communication, potentially improving patient 
outcomes such as patient trust in provider and satisfaction with care (Street, et al., 
2009).  
Gatekeeping requirements can sometimes introduce hurdles to receiving care. 
Requiring a referral from a PCP for every specialist visit may seem unnecessary for 
common medical services, such as the person seeking acne treatment from a 
dermatologist or the woman seeking an annual pap smear from an OB/GYN. Managed 
care patients have reported difficulty getting an appointment with their PCP if their MCO 
provider network is limited (Phillips, et al., 2000). Additionally, gatekeepers may limit the 
number or type of services they provide to managed care patients. In the 1990s, some 
MCOs offered providers financial incentives to restrict the number of procedures they 
provided to patients (Davidoff et al., 2007). Likewise, some PCPs were required to 
undergo extensive reviews of their service utilization by MCOs. The goal of these 
reviews was to reduce costs by cutting back on the use of services and procedures 
(Rodwin, 1997).  
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Outcomes of Care 
The outcomes analyzed in this study are the PROs directly related to the source 
of the managed care backlash: access to care, confidence in provider, and satisfaction 
with care. As described in Miller and Luft (1997, 2002), and was confirmed in the 
Literature Review, MCO enrollees reported relatively more problems accessing care 
than FFS patients before and during the backlash. In addition to access problems, the 
cost-driven focus of managed care undermined patient confidence in providers (Baker & 
McClellan, 2001) and decreased satisfaction with care for MCO enrollees (Dugan, 
2015).  
Mortality is also included as an outcome in this study. Past research is mixed on 
whether mortality for managed care patients differs from those with FFS insurance 
(Miller & Luft, 2002). However, studies have shown PROs are often correlated with 
clinical outcomes. For example, patients who are satisfied with their care or have 
confidence in their PCP are more likely to adhere to treatments and engage in 
behaviors associated with favorable medical outcomes (Zolnierek & Dimatteo, 2009; 
Glickman et al., 2010; Street et al., 2009). To assess whether the backlash regulations 
impacted clinical outcomes as well as PROs, mortality is also included in this study.  
Backlash Regulations 
Regulation is often considered to be a tool used by governments to respond to 
market failures (Peltzman, Levine, & Noll, 1989). Sloan and Hall (2002) identified a 
number of potential market failures in the MCO market (“consumer ignorance and 
asymmetric information; imperfect risk adjustment; myopic orientation of health plans; 
lack of consumer choice; and excessive standardization” (p.182)) suggesting that 
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concerns by patients and providers were somewhat justified. While some of these 
failures are also apparent in the market for traditional FFS insurance, lack of consumer 
choice in care decisions and excessive standardization of care are hallmarks of 
gatekeeping specific to managed care (Mechanic & Schlesinger, 1996). Accordingly, 
many of the backlash regulations weakened gatekeeping restrictions to force MCOs to 
operate more like traditional insurance.  
All states passed at least one backlash regulation, but most states passed many 
(Table 2). The backlash regulations impacted multiple aspects of care. Over half of 
states passed laws allowing women to see an OB/GYN without first seeing their PCP, 
permitting patients with chronic illnesses to visit long-standing specialists without a 
referral, and ensuring patients with rare diseases could continue visiting their doctor 
even if he/she left the MCO network (continuity of care). In 39 states, MCOs were 
required to cover expenses for Emergency Room visits. Additionally, any willing 
provider laws forced MCOs to accept into their network any provider that met certain 
requirements, enlarging the pool of available doctors for MCO enrollees in 26 states. All 
these laws provided patients with more control over their care choices and PCPs with 
more time to engage in direct care for patients (as opposed to unnecessary visits for 
specialist referrals), potentially leading to increased access to care and satisfaction with 
provider.  
A major aspect of the managed care backlash was patients’ belief that PCP 
treatment decisions were influenced by MCOs at the expense of quality of care (Baker 
& McClellan, 2001; Dugan, 2015). Many regulations attempted to remove MCOs from   
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Table 2 
Managed Care Regulation Types and Number of States Adopting by 2004 
Type of Regulation 
Number of States 
Adopting 
Direct access to OB-GYNs 39 
Standing referrals to specialists 30 
Continuity of care protections 36 
Emergency room access under “prudent layperson” standard 39 
Any willing provider law 26 
Bans on gag rules 48 
Comprehensive reform bill 46 
Bans on provider financial incentives 31 
HMO report card established 27 
Graduated levels of internal review 40 
Independent external review of appeals required 43 
Ombudsman program 18 
Liability: right to sue health plans for damages 10 
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the decision-making by relaxing and removing constraints on care processes imposed 
by MCOs. For example, banning gag rules was the most prevalent backlash regulation. 
Gag rules prevented physicians from discussing treatments with patients that were not 
covered by the MCO. Now PCPs could discuss all possible care choices with patients, 
potentially improving or restoring trust in the patient-provider relationship. 
Comprehensive reform legislation in many states prevented MCOs from conducting 
utilization reviews of providers in which the sole purpose of the review was to cut 
services.  Additionally, most states banned MCOs from offering PCPs financial 
incentives to limit the number of procedures they provided to patients. And about half of 
states established report cards for managed care providers. These report cards 
provided managed care patients with a metric to compare the care they received from 
their PCP against a national average. Other backlash regulations granted patients the 
right to appeal MCO care coverage decisions through both internal and external review 
processes. Ombudsman programs were established to help address denial of service 
claims. In ten states, patients were granted the right to sue MCOs for damages related 
to denial of care. Again, these laws sought to give managed care patients more choice 
in their care decisions by weakening MCO constraints that caused patient 
dissatisfaction with care and a lack of confidence in providers. 
Some of the backlash regulations had the potential to impact multiple PROs. For 
example, laws banning gag rules may improve both confidence and satisfaction if 
patients believe their PCPs are now discussing all possible treatment options with them. 
Also, access and satisfaction may improve with any willing provider laws since those 
regulations add more doctors to the MCO network and may make it easier to get an 
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appointment. Consequently, all types of regulation are important to consider when 
measuring their potential to impact patient outcomes. But even regulations of the same 
type differed in scope, stringency, and level of enforcement across states. Gray et al. 
(2007) found that language in some of the comprehensive reform backlash regulations 
was so innocuous it was considered useless in practice. And Laugesen et al. (2006) 
argued that backlash regulations were sometimes passed just to benefit the legislators 
involved. Therefore, the different levels of regulatory severity or intensity should also be 
considered when analyzing the effect of these laws on patient outcomes. The 
conclusions presented in this Conceptual Framework and the Literature Review lead to 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash 
regulations will show greater improvements in access to care than managed care 
enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash 
regulations will show greater improvements in confidence in provider than 
managed care enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris 
paribus. 
Hypothesis 3. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash 
regulations will show greater improvements in satisfaction with care than 
managed care enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris 
paribus. 
Past research is mixed on whether mortality for managed care patients differed 
from those with FFS insurance. Pinkovskiy’s (2014) study on the effects of backlash 
 46 
regulations did not find evidence of county-level mortality effects, though he admits the 
data and model used were not ideal for studying mortality. Since people with chronic 
conditions can have better clinical outcomes when care is coordinated through a 
gatekeeper, this may suggest weakening gatekeeping could negatively impact patient 
health. On the other hand, research has shown patient satisfaction and other PROs are 
often correlated with clinical outcomes, suggesting improvements in PROs and mortality 
should be related. Since most people do not have complicated health care 
requirements, the evidence does not suggest the managed care regulations should 
impact overall patient mortality, leading to the last hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash 
regulations will not show different mortality outcomes than managed care 
enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris paribus. 
Conclusion 
 This study investigates changes in patient outcomes arising from the managed 
care regulatory backlash. The concepts for this study are organized using an enhanced 
version of Donabedian’s SPO framework. The main hypothesis derived from this 
framework states that PROs for managed care patients in states with a more intense 
regulatory backlash will show greater improvements than PROs for managed care 
patients in states with less intense regulations. The next chapter describes the methods 
and data used to test this hypothesis. The variables identified in the conceptual 
framework are incorporated into the empirical model to best isolate the effect of the 
backlash regulations on patient outcomes.  
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Chapter IV: Methods 
 
This study takes advantage of the variety of regulations enacted across states 
during the managed care backlash of the late 1990s and early 2000s to investigate their 
impact on quality of care for managed care enrollees. Four research questions ask how 
the managed care regulatory backlash affected two domains of quality of care: patient-
reported outcomes and mortality. Specifically, did regulations improve quality of care for 
managed care enrollees by improving access to care, confidence in providers, and 
satisfaction with care, and lowering mortality? This chapter describes the research 
design and methods used to answer these questions. 
Research Design 
Differences in patient outcomes between managed care and fee-for-service 
(FFS) patients are compared over time as states enacted their managed care 
regulations. Specifically, this study investigates the difference in outcomes for managed 
care patients in states with low-intensity regulations relative to managed care patients in 
states that moved to moderate and high intensity for 1996-2000 and 2000-2004. The 
empirical design controls for changes that affected both FFS and managed care 
enrollees over time that are not associated with differences in regulatory treatment, 
such as the adoption of electronic health records.  
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Data sources. 
The four data sources used in this analysis are the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS) from the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ); the 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), linked to the National Death Index, from the 
U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS); data from the paper by Gray, Lowery, 
and Godwin (2007), “Political Management of Managed Care: Explaining Variations in 
State Health Maintenance Organization Regulations;” and the Area Health Research 
File (AHRF) from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
MEPS. The MEPS contains the key variables used in this study: patient 
experiences with health care and managed care coverage. Managed care variables are 
not available for years 1997-1999, but are available for 1996 and 2000-forward. Most of 
the environmental and patient characteristics described in the conceptual framework are 
also taken from the MEPS, including geography, demographics, and health status. The 
MEPS is a nationally representative two-year overlapping panel survey of health care 
utilization and spending for non-institutionalized persons in the U.S (the institutionalized 
account for a small share of the population, including those in nursing homes, prisons, 
long-term psychiatric hospitals, and active military). MEPS sample size over the study 
period ranged from 20,000-30,000 people each year, adults and children. A single 
respondent answered questions for the entire household during multiple in-person 
interviews. People who did not utilize health services are also included in the MEPS 
sample, providing an inclusive sample of respondents. The first available year of MEPs 
data is 1996, which is used as the base year in this study. Respondent survey weights 
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account for the complex survey design of the MEPS, which oversamples certain 
segments of the population.  
NHIS. The NHIS is a 3-year overlapping panel survey from which MEPS 
respondents are chosen that covers a variety of health care topics. The NHIS is linked 
to the National Death Index, which provides mortality information for MEPS respondents 
over age 18. Sample size for NHIS ranged from 75,000-85,000 people each year, 
however there are only a couple hundred instances of mortality annually due to the low 
occurrence of death in the general population (around 0.8% in 2014 (Centers for 
Disease Control [CDC], 2015)).  
Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007). The Gray et al. paper analyzed variations in 
state managed care regulations during the backlash period. The authors provided the 
data used in their analysis, which consisted of matrices for each year and state that 
showed the passage of each backlash regulation. These matrices incorporate weights 
for stringency of regulation since Gray et al. determined that some regulations were 
passed with differing degrees of enforcement and limited scope of providers. For 
example, any willing provider laws only apply to pharmacists in some states. To account 
for these differences, some regulations were given less importance than others such 
that a regulation could have a value anywhere between 0.28 and 1. Gray et al. 
determined the details for each regulation from the sources listed in Table 3. Many of 
these sources are databases run by non-profit or professional groups, such as the 
Kaiser Family Foundation.   
  
 50 
Table 3 
Data Sources Used to Identify Managed Care Backlash Regulations, by Type of 
Regulation, Gray et al. (2007) 
1. Access to Ob-Gyns: Kaiser Family Foundation. 2004. State Mandated Benefits: 
Direct Access to OB/Gyns, 2004. 
2. Any Willing Provider: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Any Willing Provider. 
Issue Brief, Year End Report. December 31. 
3. Bans on Provider Financial Incentives: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Bans 
on Financial Incentives. Issue Brief, Year End Report. December 31. 
4. Continuity of Care: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Continuity of Care. Issue 
Brief, Year End Report. December 31. 
5. External Review Requirements: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Consumer 
Grievance Procedures: Internal and Independent Appeals. Issue Brief, Year End 
Report. December 31. 
6. Gag Bans: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Bans on Gag Clauses. Issue 
Brief, Year End Report, December 31. 
7. Internal Review: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Consumer Grievance 
Procedures: Internal and Independent Appeals. Issue Brief, Year End Report. 
8. Liability Regulations: National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) Managed 
Care Insurer Liability.  
9. Ombudsman and Report Cards: NCSL Managed Care Insurer State Laws for 
Ombudsman, Report Cards and Provider Profiles.  
10. Standing Referral to Specialists: Kaiser Family Foundation. 2004. Patients’ Rights: 
Standing Referrals for Ongoing Care with a Specialist, 2004.     
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Four states passed managed care regulations after 2003, the latest year covered 
in the Gray et al. paper. The National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) is a 
bipartisan organization that maintains a table of managed care laws, categorized by 
state, year of implementation, and type of regulation (NCSL, 2011). Information from the 
NCSL website was used in this analysis to update the matrix from the Gray et al. (2007) 
paper and account for changes that occurred to laws after 2003. This includes the 
addition of 6 various laws by 4 states and the repeal of liability laws in 10 states in 2004 
after the Supreme Court ruled against them.  
AHRF. The AHRF is a meta-database of various government statistics compiled 
by the Health Resources and Services Administration under the Department of Health 
and Human Services. The AHRF data is used to determine the barrier to care variable 
for each person, specifically, whether they live in a county with a PCP shortage. A 
severe shortage impacts the whole county and a partial shortage impacts part of the 
county.  
Sampling. 
The MEPS asks respondents about characteristics of their insurance coverage. 
This includes whether they are enrolled in an HMO plan or if they are required to use a 
gatekeeper. If people responded affirmatively to either of those questions, they are 
identified as having managed care coverage. People with insurance that is not 
managed care are classified as having traditional FFS insurance in this study. 
Uninsured individuals are excluded from the analysis.  
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Measurement of variables. 
Independent Variables. The key independent variable is the interaction of 
whether a person was a managed care enrollee and a measure of state regulatory 
intensity. The intensity score measures the scope and breadth of each state’s 
regulations contingent on three factors: number, stringency, and rarity. The regulation 
data provided by Gray et al. were already weighted for stringency such that each state 
regulation was given a value at 1 or less. They determined stringency weights by 
accounting for differing levels of enforcement and scope of laws across states. To 
account for rarity of regulations, a Saidin index was also applied. The Saidin index gives 
more weight to a phenomenon when it is relatively less common (Spetz & Baker, 1999). 
Giving rare regulations more weight distinguishes them from more commonplace laws. 
This corresponds to the finding by Sloan and Hall (2002) that states that passed rarer 
backlash regulations had the strongest overall packages of laws and were favored by 
consumer advocates. For this study, the Saidin rarity index is found using the proportion 
of states that did not pass a certain type of law. For example, 48 out of 50 states passed 
a law banning gag orders. The Saidin index value for this regulation is [1 – (48/50)] = 
0.04 (Table 4). The low weight of 0.04 reflects how common the law was. Formally, the 
intensity score for each state is determined by the weighted sum of adopted backlash 
regulations (the weights being the Saidin index and stringency weights from Gray et al.). 
The scores are cumulative and only decrease over time if a law was repealed. The 
regulatory intensity categories (low, moderate, and high) were determined from 
distribution of state intensity scores in 2004, when regulatory activity ended.  Low 
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Table 4 
Managed Care Regulation Types and the Saidin Index 
Type of Regulation 
Number of 
States Adopting 
Saidin Index 
Bans on gag rules 48 0.04 
Comprehensive reform bill 46 0.08 
Independent external review of appeals required 43 0.14 
Graduated levels of internal review 40 0.20 
Direct access to OB-GYNs 39 0.22 
Emergency room access under “prudent layperson” 
standard 
39 0.22 
Continuity of care protections 36 0.28 
Bans on provider financial incentives 31 0.38 
Standing referrals to specialists 30 0.40 
HMO report card established 27 0.46 
Any willing provider law 26 0.48 
Ombudsman program 18 0.64 
Liability: right to sue health plans for damages 10 0.80 
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intensity is represented by scores in the first quartile, moderate intensity are scores in 
the middle two quartiles and high intensity are scores in the last quartile. States were 
categorized as having low, moderate, or high intensity regulations based on their 
intensity score in each year of the study (1996, 2000, and 2004). Table 5 illustrates that 
all states begin in the low-intensity regulation category in 1996 and most shift to 
moderate- or high-intensity regulation states by 2004 (Figures 1 & 2).  
Table 5 
Number of States in each Category of Regulatory Intensity, after Stringency and Rarity 
Weights Applied 
Year  Low Moderate High 
1996 50  
2000 22 22 6 
2004 13 24 13 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of State Managed Care Backlash Regulations Passed by Year, 
Weighted by Stringency, 1994-2004 
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Figure 2. Managed Care Regulatory Backlash Intensity Graphs, 1996-2004 
Note: L=low-intensity regulation state, M=moderate, and H=high 
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Applying the Saidin index impacted the categorization of 14 out of 50 states. 
Eight states moved into a higher category, either from low- to moderate-intensity or 
moderate- to high-intensity. This often reflected the passage of regulations that were 
rarer, like adopting an ombudsman program. Six states moved into a lower category 
when the Saidin index was applied, moving from moderate- to low-intensity or high- to 
moderate-intensity. This normally happened in states that passed multiple 
commonplace regulations. 
The other characteristic used to identify our key independent variable is whether 
a person has managed care. A MEPS respondent can describe an insurance plan as an 
HMO and/or as a gatekeeper plan. In addition, a respondent can have insurance 
coverage for the whole year or for part of the year (available in monthly intervals). The 
monthly interval data show some respondents had both HMO and FFS insurance in the 
same year, so the sample is restricted to those with full-year insurance coverage to 
avoid patients with overlap. Therefore, the final definition for a managed care patient 
used in this study is someone with an HMO or gatekeeper plan that had insurance 
coverage for the entire year.  
Dependent Variables. Nine PROs from the MEPS are examined for the 1996-
2000 period and three for the 2000-2004 period (Table 6). Mortality is also examined 
using data from the NHIS. Only three of the PROs are available in the second period 
owing to a change in the survey questions in 2001. People were asked about their usual 
source of care, simplified hereafter to “Doctor” (MEPS, 2004). Questions asking about 
difficulty or satisfaction had four potential options (very difficult, somewhat difficult, not 
too difficult, not at all difficult; very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not too satisfied, not at 
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all satisfied). In those cases, responses were transformed to binary so that “not at all 
difficult,” “very satisfied,” and “somewhat satisfied” were set to positive (1) and all other 
responses set to negative (0). The other survey questions were already binary.  
Table 6 
Patient-reported Outcomes and Mortality—Dependent Variables 
Patient Outcome Survey Questions 
Access to Care 
Doctor has night or weekend hours 
Patient has no difficulty contacting Doctor by phone 
Patient has no difficulty getting an appointment* 
Patient has no difficulty accessing care* 
Patient is satisfied with ability to access care* 
Confidence in 
Providers 
Doctor asks patient about other treatments he/she is taking 
Doctor listens to patient* 
Patient is confident in Doctor* 
Satisfaction with 
Care 
Patient is satisfied with care* 
Mortality Patient did not die during survey year or year after 
 
Note: Survey questions marked with an asterisk (*) are only available in 1996 and 2000  
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Access to care is assessed using five survey questions. Two questions ask about 
difficulty and satisfaction with access to care. The other three questions ask about 
specific aspects of access to care, including difficulty making an appointment, difficulty 
contacting the Doctor on the phone, and availability of Doctor during night and weekend 
hours. Though these questions seem similar, summary statistics show the responses 
can be different (see Table 8a in the Results chapter). For example, 90% of MC 
enrollees in 1996 reported no difficulty accessing care, but only 43% reported no 
difficulty getting an appointment. Thus, the access to care variables are analyzed 
individually and not aggregated into a single access measure. 
 Confidence in providers is operationalized using three survey questions (Table 
6). One question asks if the respondent is confident in his/her provider, another asks if 
the Doctor listens, and the last question is whether the Doctor asks patients about other 
treatments they are taking. This last question is relevant because research has shown 
patients are confident in providers who are respectful, listen, and include the patient in 
the decision-making process (Verbeek et al., 2004). Only the last question was asked in 
both periods. Satisfaction with care is asked about directly and mortality is determined 
by whether the person survived in the survey year and year after.  
Control Variables. The control variables include the structural characteristics 
described in the conceptual framework. The factors are operationalized using standard 
measures from previous research. Specifically, barriers to care are represented using 
indicators for whether the person lives in a county with a severe or partial PCP shortage 
and whether the person lives in a metropolitan area (White, Bazzoli, Roggenkamp, & 
Gu, 2005). The relevant health and demographic information include race, gender, 
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marital status, individual income, education, Hispanic heritage, self-reported poor 
health, pre-existing chronic condition indicator, and Medicare or Medicaid status. These 
variables were all represented with binary indicators except income, which was 
transformed to constant-2004 dollars using the overall Consumer Price Index.  
Observations were dropped if values were missing for age, education or 
metropolitan area, which was relatively uncommon (1% of observations). However, 
missing values for income was more common (65% of observations), so those values 
were imputed rather than losing those observations. The average annual income for 
each reference group (FFS and MCO for high/moderate/low-intensity category) was 
used in place of missing values (n=). More sophisticated imputation techniques for 
income that incorporate race and health status were not pursued due to the relatively 
small sample sizes of minority subpopulations in some reference groups.   
Validity and Reliability. Validity is addressed in this model first by operationalizing 
constructs using common concepts and definitions from past research as outlined in the 
conceptual framework. These constructs are included in the model to help control for 
confounders and isolate the true effect of regulations. Also, the reliability of the outcome 
variables is enhanced by using questions asked in the same manner, from the same 
survey, for all years of the analysis.  
Methods of Procedures for Hypothesis Testing 
A difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach is used to address the 
research question. Using the DDD model, differences in patient outcomes between 
managed care and FFS patients are compared over time as states enacted their 
managed care regulations. This empirical design controls for changes that affected both 
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FFS and managed care enrollees unrelated to regulatory treatment, such as changes in 
health over time.  
Most of the managed care regulations were passed between 1996-2000 and 
were usually implemented within a year of being passed. A few dozen regulations were 
enacted prior to 1996. Data availability prevents the use of an earlier base year, though 
it would not impact this analysis given how few regulations were passed at the time. The 
end of the backlash period is often considered to be between 2001-2002 (Sloan et al., 
2005), but 2004 marks the last year of significant regulatory activity. Therefore, two 
periods are examined, 1996-2000 and 2000-2004.   
Analytical strategies. 
Logistic regressions are run separately for each binary dependent variable. 
Combining the five access to care and three confidence in provider variables into 
individual composite variables was ruled out because each variable captures different 
aspects of each outcome. These DDD regressions measure the change in outcomes for 
managed care patients in states with low-intensity regulations relative to patients in 
states that switched to moderate- and high-intensity, controlling for changes in 
corresponding FFS patients. Robust standard errors (SEs) are calculated to account for 
the complex survey design of MEPS which oversamples certain segments of the 
population. Since all states are considered low intensity in 1996, the 1996-2000 
regression varies slightly from the 2000-2004 regression. Formula 1 is for the first 
period, 1996-2000, and Formula 2 is for the second period, 2000-2004.The DDD 
parameter for 2000-2004 is MC*High*2004, but this interaction is dropped in 1996-2000 
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because MC*High*2000 is collinear with MC*High (since no state was considered high-
intensity in 1996).  
Formula 1. 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎12000 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 +
𝑎22000 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖  + 𝛽5𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
Formula 2. 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐12004 + 𝛾1𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 +
𝑐22004 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 +  𝑐32004 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖  + 𝛾5𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 +
𝑐42004 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐52004 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
β4 and β5 are the parameters of interest for 1996-2000 
c4 and c5 are the parameters of interest for 2000-2004 
Outcome = PROs and mortality 
MC = managed care dummy (MC=1 for MC enrollees) 
Moderate = moderate intensity regulation state dummy (Moderate=1 for states with 
moderate-intensity regulations) 
High = high intensity regulation state dummy (High=1 for states with high-intensity 
regulations) 
F = vector of control variables  
Sensitivity analysis. 
 Ideally, a sensitivity test would be conducted to quantify the impact of using the 
Saidin rarity index. Running the analysis excluding the Saidin Index would present a 
more comparable model to past research on the backlash regulations which do not 
include the Saidin index (Sloan et al., 2005; Pinkovskiy 2014). However, due to data 
confidentiality issues, robustness checks could not be run on the categorization of 
states into different intensity categories. State-level MEPS data are confidential and due 
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to restrictions on the data, only one categorization of states was authorized for this 
study. The concern by AHRQ was that an individual state could be identified if the 
results of different categorizations of states were compared. Therefore, different 
categorizations of state regulatory intensities could not be tested.  
Limitations. 
Despite the care taken in designing this study, there are important limitations to 
consider. There were three main issues that arose from using the MEPS data.  First, 
identifying managed care enrollees is not possible in the MEPS for 1997-1999. 
Therefore, those years cannot be included in this analysis to test for effects using 
different time periods. Second, the survey changed in 2001 and questions were no 
longer asked about satisfaction with care and about most aspects of confidence in 
provider. This prevented a comparison of these outcomes between the first and second 
period. Finally, like many health care surveys, the MEPS has issues with non-response 
and under-representation of certain populations, such as the very sick (Zuvekas & Olin, 
2009). This is important because people who are sick are more likely to report 
dissatisfaction with care and have different responses to other PROs (Zaslavsky & 
Cleary, 2002). This issue was addressed by including variables for old age, severe 
disabilities, and chronic conditions.  
Though the empirical strategy in this study attempts to control for as many 
confounders as possible, the model contains certain drawbacks. The timing, number, 
and interrelatedness of regulations prevents an analysis of the impact of individual laws 
on patient outcomes. Therefore, the causal link between the regulations and any 
observed enhancements in quality is somewhat limited since improvements cannot be 
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attributed to specific laws. In addition, if omitted variable bias is present and unobserved 
factors are influencing both the intensity of the backlash and patient outcomes, then 
endogeneity may be an issue. However, Gray et al. (2007) and Pinkovskiy (2014) find 
no evidence that MC enrollees in states that passed more regulations had worse 
outcomes prior to the backlash, weakening the endogeneity argument. Additionally, the 
DDD model used in this study controls for changes in corresponding FFS patients 
during the backlash, providing an additional level of control to combat omitted variable 
bias. The next chapter describes the results of this analysis, including a summary of the 
descriptive statistics and regression results.  
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Chapter V: Results 
 
 Differences in patient outcomes between managed care (MC) and fee-for-service 
(FFS) enrollees are compared over time as states enacted regulations specific to 
managed care organizations during the period known as the “managed care backlash.” 
To start this chapter, summary statistics are described for key variables across the 
sample. The results of the hypothesis testing are then presented. A detailed discussion 
of policy implications and limitations to this study are presented in the next chapter.  
Summary Statistics 
 Table 7 provides the unweighted sample sizes by insurance status and 
regulatory intensity category for each year represented in the analysis. Overall, the 
MEPS sample size of people with any health insurance increased from 19,142 in 1996 
to 28,635 by 2004. Of those three years, managed care enrollment was highest in 2000, 
when 44% of MEPS respondents with insurance reported having managed care. By 
2004, low-intensity states had the smallest sample sizes, especially for MC enrollees 
(n=850, or 3% of annual sample). 
 Tables 8a-c show the summary statistics of demographic information by MC 
status. The MEPS survey weights have been applied to these data to make them 
nationally representative. Table 8a compares mean values for FFS and MC enrollees in 
1996. Tables 8b-c are further delineated by regulatory intensity (low/moderate/high) for 
  
6
5
 
Table 7 
Unweighted Sample Sizes by Insurance Type and State Regulatory Intensity  
 
 
Managed Care Fee-For-Service Total Sample 
Regulatory Intensity  Regulatory Intensity  Regulatory Intensity  
Low Moderate High Total Low Moderate High Total Low Moderate High Total 
(n)          
1996  7,014  7,014 12,128  12,128 19,142  19,142 
2000 1,926 3,951 3,474 9,351 3,623 4,635 3,657 11,915 5,549 8,586 7,131 21,266 
2004 850 3,637 4,425 8,912 3,007 7,566 9,150 19,723 3,857 11,203 13,575 28,635 
(%) 
1996  37  37 63  63 100  100 
2000 9 19 16 44 17 22 17 56 26 40 34 100 
2004 3 13 15 31 11 26 32 69 13 39 47 100 
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Table 8a 
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Control Variables by Insurance Status, 1996 (standard deviation) 
 Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
Age 
33 
(22) 
37† 
(27) 
Female (%) 51 53† 
Race (%) 
    Black 11 13† 
    White 83 83† 
    Other 6 4† 
Hispanic (%) 9 10† 
Married (%) 48 40† 
Education (%) 
    No high school degree  32 43† 
    High school 40 37† 
    College 28 19† 
Chronic condition prevalence (%) 26 34† 
Self-reported bad health (%) 6 13† 
Lives in metropolitan area (%) 88 70† 
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(Table 8a continued) 
 Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
Lives in county with severe PCP 
shortage (%) 
46 44 
Lives in county with partial PCP 
shortage (%) 
38 38 
Individual Income (constant-2004$) 34,169  25,445† 
Medicare disabled (%) 0.5 3.3† 
Medicare aged (%) 4.4 17.8† 
 
†Significant difference between MC and FFS (p<0.05) 
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Table 8b 
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Control Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory Intensity, 
2000 
 
Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
Regulatory Intensity 
Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
Age 
33 
(21) 
33 
(22) 
32 
(20) 
38‡ 
(27) 
39‡ 
(28) 
38‡ 
(25) 
Female (%) 52 50 52 52 53‡ 54‡ 
Race (%) 
    Black 12 11 14 12‡ 12‡ 15 
    White 87 86 77 86‡ 84‡ 78 
    Other 2 4 8 2 4‡ 7‡ 
Hispanic (%) 3 6 19 3 7‡ 25‡ 
Married (%) 48 46 45 44‡ 39‡ 37‡ 
Education (%) 
No high school   
degree  
32 35 36 41‡ 42‡ 47‡ 
    High school 42 38 36 40‡ 38‡ 33‡ 
    College 26 27 28 19‡ 20‡ 20‡ 
Chronic condition 
prevalence (%) 
32 28 25 40‡ 41‡ 40‡ 
Self-reported bad 
health (%) 
6 6 6 14‡ 13‡ 12‡ 
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(Table 8b continued) 
 Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
 Regulatory Intensity 
 Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
Lives in metropolitan area 
(%) 
73 85 98 58‡ 76‡ 90‡ 
Lives in county with severe 
PCP shortage (%) 
34 43 48 38‡ 48‡ 48‡ 
Lives in county with partial 
PCP shortage (%) 
44 40 36 45 37‡ 31‡ 
Individual Income (constant-
2004$) 
34,756 
(33,739) 
36,660 
(24,556)  
38,018 
(25,529) 
27,390‡ 
(23,599) 
27,017‡ 
(22,245) 
27,045‡ 
(26,378) 
Medicare disabled (%) 0.7 0.7 0.6 3.5‡ 4.9‡ 3.6‡ 
Medicare aged (%) 3.4 4.3 3.9 19.1‡ 22.2‡ 19.5‡ 
 
‡Significant difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05) 
  
  
7
0 
Table 8c 
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Control Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory Intensity, 
2004 
 
Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
Regulatory Intensity 
Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
Age 
35 
(19) 
34 
(21) 
34 
(18) 
38‡ 
(24) 
38‡ 
(24) 
38 
(21) 
Female (%) 49 51 51 52 53‡ 53‡ 
Race (%) 
    Black 9 10 13 14‡ 10‡ 15‡ 
    White 85 84 76 82‡ 84‡ 78 
    Other 6 6 11 4‡ 6 7‡ 
Hispanic (%) 5 7 17 3‡ 9‡ 20‡ 
Married (%) 50 48 45 41‡ 40‡ 39‡ 
Education (%) 
No high school degree  31 31 33 40‡ 39‡ 43‡ 
    High school 43 37 37 38‡ 39‡ 34‡ 
    College 26 31 30 22‡ 22‡ 23‡ 
Chronic condition 
prevalence (%) 
33 37 33 43‡ 42‡ 42‡ 
Self-reported bad health 
(%) 
7 7 7 13‡ 12‡ 12‡ 
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(Table 8c continued) 
 
Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
Regulatory Intensity 
Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
Lives in metropolitan area (%) 75 87 95 65‡ 75‡ 84‡ 
Lives in county with severe 
PCP shortage (%) 
36 51 37 43‡ 56‡ 38‡ 
Lives in county with partial 
PCP shortage (%) 
44 37 47 41 32‡ 42‡ 
Individual Income (constant-
2004$) 
35,189 
(21,775)  
37,755 
(25,124) 
38,349 
(26,766) 
27,158‡ 
(20,915) 
28,138‡  
(21,831) 
28,126‡ 
(21,028) 
Medicare disabled (%) 0.5 0.6 0.5 4.3‡ 4.6‡ 4.4‡ 
Medicare aged (%) 4.1  3.9  4.4  16.7‡ 17.8‡ 17.1‡ 
 
‡Significant difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05) 
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2000 and 2004, respectively. T-tests (p <= 0.05) run on these means found statistically 
significant differences for many demographic variables between MC and FFS enrollees 
in states with the same regulatory intensity each year. In general, MC enrollees were 
more likely to be younger, married, have higher incomes, have college degrees, and live 
in a metropolitan area, and they were less likely to have a chronic condition or report 
being in poor health relative to FFS enrollees. In contrast, a higher share of both MC 
and FFS respondents reported having a chronic condition in 2004 versus 1996 or 2000. 
The most drastic change was for MC enrollees in moderate-intensity regulation states, 
where 25% of people reported a chronic condition in 2000 versus 37% in 2004.  
 Demographic information was mostly similar across the different regulatory 
categories (low/moderate/high-intensity) for 2000 and 2004. However, states with high-
intensity regulations had a higher proportion of minority and Hispanic people than states 
with low- or moderate-intensity regulations. Additionally, a lower proportion of people in 
low-regulation intensity states lived in a metropolitan area compared to those in 
moderate- and high-intensity states.   
 Tables 9a-c summarize the dependent variables for each reference group. Table 
9a compares information for FFS and MC enrollees in 1996. Tables 9b-c are further 
delineated by regulatory intensity (low/moderate/high) for 2000 and 2004, respectively. 
Many outcomes showed no significant difference between the two groups. When 
significant differences were found, the values were often very similar. Contrary to 
research showing dissatisfaction with managed care (Miller & Luft, 2002), 94% of MC 
enrollees reported satisfaction with care in 1996 (Table 9a), just below the response of   
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Table 9a  
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by Insurance Status, 1996 (%) 
 Managed Care Fee-for-Service 
Access to Care 
 
Doctor has night or weekend hours  55 45† 
Patient has no difficulty contacting Doctor 
by phone 
39 42† 
Patient has no difficulty getting an 
appointment 
43 44 
Patient has no difficulty accessing care 90 90 
Patient is satisfied with ability to access 
care 
96 94† 
Confidence in 
Providers 
Doctor asks patient if he/she is taking 
other treatments 
75 79† 
Doctor listens to patient 97 97 
Patient is confident in Doctor 95 97† 
Satisfaction with 
Care 
Patient is satisfied with care 94 96† 
Mortality 
Patient did not die during survey year or 
year after 
99.5 98.4† 
 
†Significant difference between MC and FFS (p<0.05) 
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Table 9b  
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory 
Intensity, 2000 (%) 
 
Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
Regulatory Intensity 
Low 
Mod-
erate 
High  Low 
Mod-
erate 
High 
Access to Care 
 
Doctor has night or weekend 
hours  
49 57 45  38‡ 47‡ 35‡ 
Patient has no difficulty 
contacting Doctor by phone 
46 44 39  44 46 40 
Patient has no difficulty getting 
an appointment 
46 44 42  44 48 46‡ 
Patient has no difficulty 
accessing care 
93 94 91  90‡ 88‡ 87‡ 
Patient is satisfied with ability 
to access care 
97 98 95  95‡ 93‡ 91‡ 
Confidence in 
Providers 
Doctor asks patient if he/she is 
taking other treatments 
80 79 82  80 84‡ 85‡ 
Doctor listens to patient 98 97 97  97 97 97 
Patient is confident in Doctor 96 96 96  96 97 96 
Satisfaction with 
Care 
Patient is satisfied with care 97 94 95  96 94 95 
  Low Moderate/High Low 
Moderate/
High 
Mortality 
Patient did not die during 
survey year or year after 
99.5 99.7 98.5‡ 97.9‡ 
 
‡Significant difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05)  
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Table 9c  
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory 
Intensity, 2004 (%) 
 
Managed Care Fee-For-Service 
Regulatory Intensity 
Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
Access to Care 
 
Doctor has night or weekend 
hours 
39 55 47 37‡ 43‡ 34‡ 
Patient has no difficulty 
contacting Doctor by phone 
59 59 54 57‡ 57 56 
Confidence in 
Providers 
Doctor asks patient if he/she 
is taking other treatments 
75 80 77 77 77‡ 77 
  Low Moderate/High Low Moderate/High 
Mortality 
Patient did not die during 
survey year or year after 
99.3 99.8 98.0‡ 98.5‡ 
 
‡Significant difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05) 
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96% for FFS respondents. Satisfaction rates increased slightly for most MC enrollees 
between 1996 and 2000. Also, at least 90% of all respondents reported being satisfied 
with their ability to access to care in every reference group in 1996 and 2000. (People 
were asked about their “usual source of care,” simplified here and afterwards as 
“Doctor”). Likewise, at least 95% of all respondents reported feeling confident in their 
Doctor in both 1996 and 2000. Lastly, most respondents reported their Doctor asked 
them about other treatments they were taking across all three years. 
 Despite high satisfaction with care and ability to access to care, most 
respondents reported at least some difficulty getting an appointment with their Doctor in 
1996 and 2000. In 1996, 43% of MC and 44% of FFS respondents reported difficulty 
getting an appointment, while responses ranged between 42-48% for MC and FFS 
enrollees in 2000 across different levels of regulatory intensity. Additionally, only 42% of 
FFS and 39% of MC enrollees reported no difficulty contacting their Doctor by the 
phone in 1996. However, this result improved by 2004, when 54-59% of respondents 
across all reference groups reported no difficulty contacting their Doctor by the phone.   
 Mortality was rare for all groups across the three years, with 98-99% of 
respondents living until at least a year after they were in the survey. Due to the very 
small number of mortality observations (only a couple of hundred per year), patients in 
states with high- and moderate-intensity were combined and compared to low-intensity 
regulation states. Managed care patients had a slightly higher likelihood of survival for 
all years relative to their FFS counterparts.   
 77 
Hypothesis Testing 
A difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) model is used to estimate 
differences in patient outcomes between MC and FFS patients as backlash regulations 
were passed. For each period, the DDD model measures the change in outcomes for 
managed care patients (relative to FFS patients) in states with low-intensity regulations 
relative to patients in states that switched to moderate- and high-intensity (again relative 
to FFS patients). Tables 10a-b show regression results for the key independent 
variables for 1996-2000 and 2000-2004, respectively. The key variables include the 
dummies for managed care, regulatory intensity, post-period, and their interactions. The 
regulatory effects are shown as the DDD estimates: MC*Moderate and MC*High for 
1996-2000 and MC*Moderate*2004 and MC*High*2004 for 2000-2004 (since all states 
are considered low intensity in 1996, the formulas used to estimate the effects are 
slightly different; see Formulas 1 & 2 in the Methods Chapter). For clarity, parameter 
estimates for the control variables are not shown, but are included in Appendix A.  
Main model results. 
The first three hypotheses in this study predict MC enrollees in states with more 
intense backlash regulations will show greater improvements in access to care, 
confidence in provider, and satisfaction relative to MC enrollees in states with less 
intense backlash regulations, ceteris paribus. Overall, some support was found in the 
second period for the access to care and confidence in provider hypotheses, but results 
were negative for access to care in the first period and no support was found for the 
patient satisfaction hypothesis. The rest of this chapter describes the regression results 
in detail. Explanations for these results are provided in the next chapter.   
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Table 10a  
Average Marginal Effects and Standard Errors for 1996-2000 
  Access to Care   Confidence in Provider 
  
Doctor has 
night or 
weekend 
hours 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by 
phone 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
accessing 
care 
Patient is 
satisfied 
with 
ability to 
access 
care 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
getting an 
appointment 
 
Doctor asks 
patient if 
he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
Doctor 
listens 
to 
patient 
Patient is 
confident in 
Doctor 
y2000 0.0013 -0.0859*** 0.0021 -0.0027 0.0033 0.0546*** 0.0067 -0.0054 
  (0.0161) (0.0149) (0.0138) (0.0084) (0.0246) (0.0146) (0.0067) (0.0074) 
Managed 
Care (MC) 
0.0471*** -0.0282** -0.0202*** 0.0007 -0.0045 -0.0282*** -0.0034 -0.0168*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0137) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.0153) (0.0109) (0.0047) (0.0053) 
Moderate 0.0304** 0.1013*** -0.0100 -0.0098 0.0317 0.0013 0.0014 0.0094 
  (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0161) (0.0105) (0.0312) (0.0133) (0.0073) (0.0088) 
High -0.0935*** 0.0850*** -0.0239 -0.0149 0.0262 -0.0016 0.0027 0.0075 
  (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0094) (0.0275) (0.0117) (0.0077) (0.0089) 
MC * 
y2000 
-0.0150 -0.0009 0.0350*** 0.0228** 0.0266 -0.0290* 0.0059 0.0105 
  (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0164) (0.0118) (0.0313) (0.0164) (0.0092) (0.0096) 
MC * 
Moderate 
0.0097 0.0161 0.0200 0.0179 -0.0547* 0.0246 -0.0088 -0.0012 
  (0.0212) (0.0205) (0.0198) (0.0142) (0.0334) (0.0173) (0.0103) (0.0127) 
MC * High 0.0223 -0.0072 -0.0037 -0.0150 -0.0683* 0.0166 -0.0134 -0.0013 
  (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0207) (0.0143) (0.0354) (0.0168) (0.0106) (0.0127) 
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(Table 10a continued) 
  Satisfaction  
  
  Mortality 
  
Patient is satisfied with 
care 
  
Patient did not die 
during the survey 
year, or year after 
y2000 -0.0056 y2000 0.0009 
  (0.0081)   (0.0008) 
Managed Care (MC) -0.0167** MC 0.0011 
  (0.0073)   (0.0015) 
Moderate  -0.0176** ModHigh 0.0010 
  (0.0087)   (0.0007) 
High -0.0031 
  
  (0.0097) 
MC * y2000 0.0294** MC * y2000 -0.0025 
  (0.0131)   (0.0024) 
MC * Moderate -0.0082 MC * ModHigh -0.0011 
  (0.0133)   (0.0021) 
MC * High -0.0181 
  
  (0.0151) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 10b 
Average Marginal Effects and Standard Errors for 2000-2004  
  Access to Care 
 Confidence in 
Provider 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mortality 
  
Doctor has night 
or weekend 
hours 
Patient has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by 
phone 
Doctor asks 
patient if he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
 
Patient did 
not die 
during the 
survey year, 
or year after 
y2004 -0.0482* 0.1378*** -0.0155 y2004 0.0007 
  (0.0263) (0.0302) (0.0240)  (0.0016) 
MC 0.0454*** -0.0233* -0.0346*** MC 0.0011 
  (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0114)  (0.0016) 
Moderate (Mod) 0.0443* 0.0341 0.0550*** ModHigh 0.0010 
  (0.0250) (0.0233) (0.0193)  (0.0011) 
High -0.0974*** -0.0175 0.0662*** 
 
  (0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0179) 
MC * y2004 -0.0751** 0.0451 0.0069 MC * y2004 -0.0046 
  (0.0350) (0.0316) (0.0303)  (0.0035) 
MC * Moderate -0.0157 -0.0038 -0.0272 MC * ModHigh -0.0023 
  (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0206)  (0.0025) 
MC * High 0.0024 0.0050 -0.0161 
 
  (0.0260) (0.0245) (0.0265) 
Mod * y2004 0.0127 -0.0245 -0.0573* ModHigh * y2004 -0.0002 
  (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0316)  (0.0019) 
High * y2004 0.0455 0.0198 -0.0728** 
 
  (0.0352) (0.0366) (0.0304) 
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(Table 10b continued) 
 Access to Care 
 Confidence in 
Provider 
  Mortality 
 
Doctor has 
night or 
weekend hours 
Patient has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by phone 
Doctor asks 
patient if he/she 
is taking other 
treatments 
  
Patient did 
not die during 
the survey 
year, or year 
after 
MC * Mod * y2004 0.1077** -0.0064 0.0809** 
 
MC * ModHigh 
* y2004 
0.0048 
  (0.0474) (0.0421) (0.0371)  (0.0043) 
MC * High * y2004 0.1017** -0.0594 0.0299 
 
  (0.0455) (0.0415) (0.0418) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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The following section explains each element of the regression results for a single 
outcome, to clarify the meaning of the marginal effect for each variable as they are 
presented in the tables. Specifically, the results for “Doctor Asks Patient if He/She is 
Taking Other Treatments” for 2000-2004 are explained for each variable in the order 
they are presented in Table 10b. After the marginal effects for this specific outcome are 
explained, the rest of the chapter summarizes the statistically significant results for the 
key independent variables. Specifically, the DDD estimates are presented for both 
periods, which show the regulatory effects for each outcome variable, followed by a 
summary of the results for the managed care and regulatory intensity dummies.  
Confidence in Provider. This section explains the regression results for “Doctor 
Asks Patient if He/She is Taking Other Treatments” for 2000-2004 as they are 
presented in Table 10b. The results suggest there was no significant difference in the 
likelihood of patients reporting their Doctors asked about other treatments they were 
taking in 2004 compared to 2000, holding all else equal (marginal effect [ME] = -0.0155, 
standard error [SE] = 0.0240; Table 10b). However, significant differences were found 
for both the MC dummy and the regulation dummies. On average, people with MC in 
the first period reported a 3.46 percentage point lower likelihood of Doctors asking 
about other treatments relative to FFS patients. In contrast, people in states with 
moderate- and high-intensity regulations were more likely to report Doctors asking 
about other treatments in the first period (by 5.50 and 6.62 percentage points, 
respectively). The interaction of MC with 2004 was statistically insignificant, as were the 
interactions of MC with the regulation dummies. The latter finding means MC enrollees 
in states with different regulatory intensities did not report differences in confidence in 
 83 
provider in the first period, on average. People in moderate- and high-intensity 
regulation states in 2004 were less likely to report a Doctor asked about other 
treatments they were taking (-5.73 percentage points and -7.28 percentage points, 
respectively).  
The DDD estimates are the final two parameters in Table 10b. Significant effects 
were found for moderate-intensity regulation states, but not for high-intensity states. 
Specifically, MC patients in states that moved from low-intensity regulations to 
moderate-intensity between 2000 and 2004 were more likely to report their Doctor 
asked them about other treatments there were taking by 8.09 percentage points, 
controlling for changes in FFS patients. No regulatory effects were found for high-
intensity states. These results are discussed in the next chapter.  
The next three sections summarize the results for the main variables of interest 
across all outcomes and time periods. The regulatory effects (DDD estimates) are first 
summarized, followed by the individual estimates on the managed care and regulatory 
intensity dummies. Unlike the previous section which discussed results for a single 
outcome, these sections summarize results across outcomes for each key independent 
variable. This allows for a more comprehensive comparison of results across all 
outcomes. To keep the presentation of results concise, only the statistically significant 
results are mentioned.  
Regulatory Effect. This section describes the regulatory effects on MC patients 
when moving from low- to moderate- or high-intensity regulations, as represented by the 
DDD estimates (MC*Mod and MC*High for 1996-2000; MC*Mod*2004 and 
MC*High*2004 for 2000-2004). Significant results were negative in the first period for 
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access to care, but were positive in the second period for access to care and 
confidence in provider. For access to care in the first period, the probability of MC 
enrollees reporting no difficulty making an appointment was 5.47 percentage points less 
in states that moved from low- to moderate-intensity regulations and 6.83 percentage 
points less when states went from low- to high-intensity (Table 10a). However, in the 
second period, MC enrollees in states that went from low-intensity to moderate- or high-
intensity were more likely to report their Doctor was accessible on nights and weekends 
(10.77 and 10.17 percentage points, respectively; Table 10b). Also in the second 
period, MC enrollees in states that went from low intensity to moderate were 8.09 
percentage points more likely to report their Doctor asked them about other treatments 
(Table 10b). Results did not indicate any regulatory effect on patient satisfaction, which 
was only available for the first period. Regulatory effects were also not found for the 
mortality outcome, as expected.  
These results show states with a moderate-intensity regulatory backlash saw 
positive results for MC enrollees in the second period for both access to care and 
confidence in provider. However, the only significant regulatory effect in the first period 
was negative and showed MC enrollees reported relatively worse access to care in 
states that enacted moderate- and high-intensity regulations.  
Managed Care. This section describes the managed care dummy estimates (MC 
and MC*2000 for 1996-2000; MC, MC*2004, MC*Mod, and MC*High for 2000-2004). 
Results showed outcomes for MC enrollees, in general, were mostly negative relative to 
FFS enrollees. The only positive result was found in a single access to care variable—
MC enrollees were significantly more likely to have access to Doctors on nights or 
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weekends (ME = 0.0471; Table 10a; ME=0.0454; Table 10b). However, they were less 
likely to report no difficulty contacting the Doctor by phone in both periods (ME = -
0.0282; Table 10a; ME=0.0233; Table 10b) and less likely to report no difficulty 
accessing care in the first period (ME = -0.0202; Table 10a).  
The significant confidence and satisfaction outcomes for MC enrollees were all 
negative. MC enrollees were less likely to report Doctors asked about other treatments 
they were taking by 2.82 percentage points in the first period (Table 10a) and by 3.46 
percentage points in the second period (Table 10b). Additionally, MC enrollees reported 
less confidence in provider in the first period (ME = -0.0168; Table 10a) and less 
satisfaction with care (ME = -0.0167; Table 10a). These last two questions were only 
available in the first period. 
Mixed results were found for the MC interactions. In the first period (MC*2000), 
results were positive for access and satisfaction, but negative for confidence. 
Specifically, MC enrollees in 2000 were more likely to report having no difficulty 
accessing care (ME = 0.0350; Table 10a), being satisfied with ability to access to care, 
(ME = 0.0228), and being satisfied with care (ME = 0.0294). However, they were less 
likely to report that Doctors asked if they were taking other treatments (ME = -0.0290; 
Table 10a). In the second period (MC*2004), the only significant effect was negative for 
access to care. Specifically, MC enrollees in 2004 were less likely to report their Doctor 
had night or weekend hours (ME = -0.0751; Table 10b). No significant effects were 
found for the interaction of MC with the regulatory intensity dummies (MC*Mod and 
MC*High) for any of the outcomes for 2000-2004.  
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To summarize, the results suggest MC enrollees, on average, reported relatively 
worse confidence in provider and satisfaction than people with FFS insurance. Both 
positive and negative results were found for access to care. However, the interactions 
suggest access to care and satisfaction improved between 1996 and 2000 for MC 
enrollees. There is no indication of average improvements for MC enrollees during the 
second period, 2000-2004. 
Regulations. This section describes the remaining regulatory intensity dummy 
estimates (Moderate and High for 1996-2000; Moderate, High, Mod*2004, and 
High*2004 for 2000-2004). Results showed mostly positive outcomes for the regulation 
intensity variables. All significant access and confidence variables for moderate-
intensity states were positive for both periods. Specifically, people in moderate-intensity 
states in the first period were more likely to report their Doctor had night or weekend 
hours and to report having no difficulty contacting their Doctor by phone (ME = 0.0304 
and 0.1013, respectively; Table 10a). In the second period, they were again more likely 
to report their Doctor had night or weekend hours and to report their Doctor asked them 
about other treatments they were taking (ME = 0.0443 and 0.0550, respectively; Table 
10b). The only negative parameter for moderate-intensity states was in the first period, 
when people in those states were less likely to report being satisfied with care (ME = -
0.0176; Table 10a).  
Results for the high-intensity regulation dummies were mixed for access to care 
and positive for confidence in provider. People in these states were less likely to report 
their Doctor had night or weekend hours in both periods (ME = -0.0935; Table 10a; and 
ME = -0.0974; Table 10b). But they were more likely to report having no difficulty 
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contacting their Doctor by phone in the first period (ME = 0.0850; Table 10a) and that 
their Doctor asked them about other treatments they were taking (ME = 0.0662; Table 
10b).  
To summarize, the results suggest people in states with moderate-intensity 
regulations enrollees, on average, reported relatively better access to care and 
confidence in provider than people in low-intensity regulation states. People in high-
intensity regulation states also reported relatively greater confidence in provider, but 
results were mixed for access to care.  
Additional analysis. 
A base model was estimated that only included the key independent variables to 
test the model specification. As expected, the base model parameters (Appendix B) 
were generally consistent with those in the fully-specified model, except for mortality. 
The mortality variable in the baseline model showed positive, statistically significant 
results for MC patients in moderate/high-intensity regulation states (relative likelihood of 
being alive in the survey year or year after was estimated to be 0.94 percentage points; 
Appendix Table 2c). However, these results were not significant in the fully-specified 
model when relevant control variables were included, such as old age and self-reported 
poor health.  
Summary 
Results indicate states with a moderate-intensity regulatory backlash saw 
positive results for MC enrollees for both access to care and confidence in provider in 
the second period. However, MC enrollees reported relatively worse access to care in 
states that enacted moderate- and high-intensity regulations in the first period. No 
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significant regulatory effects were found for satisfaction with care or mortality. The 
results also showed MC enrollees, on average, reported relatively worse confidence in 
provider and satisfaction than people with FFS insurance. However, access to care and 
satisfaction with care appeared to improve between 1996 and 2000 for MC enrollees, 
on average (but not between 2000 and 2004). Finally, results find people in states with 
moderate- and high-intensity regulations, on average, reported relatively better 
confidence in provider than people in low-intensity regulation states and people in 
moderate-intensity regulations states also reported improvements in access to care. 
The next chapter includes a detailed discussion of these results in context of the 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework chapters. Policy implications and future 
research are also discussed.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion  
 
Hundreds of state laws were passed during the managed care backlash of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. The backlash reflected negative public sentiment arising 
from the widespread belief that access to services and quality of care was suffering due 
to the cost-driven decisions of MCOs (Goldberg, 1999). The intent of many backlash 
regulations was to force MCOs to operate more like traditional FFS insurance. Many of 
the regulations eased or eliminated constraints on utilization that prevented patient 
access to care. Several regulations gave providers more flexibility in the way they 
practiced care. Other laws helped patients appeal denials of service. Whether the 
backlash regulations translated to better outcomes for MC enrollees is examined in this 
study. The results indicate the regulations did improve outcomes for MC enrollees, but 
to a varying degree and only in the latter period of the backlash. Specifically, MC 
enrollees who lived in states that adopted moderate-intensity regulations between 2000 
and 2004 reported relatively better improvements in access to care and confidence in 
provider relative to MC enrollees in low-intensity regulations states. Similar positive 
effects for access to care were found for MC enrollees in states that adopted high-
intensity regulations. Conversely, access to care was found to be relatively worse for 
MC enrollees in states that adopted moderate- or high-intensity backlash regulations 
between 1996 and 2000. And no evidence was found to support backlash regulations 
had a positive effect on patient satisfaction with care. This chapter offers a few 
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explanations for these outcomes. Possible implications for health care policy and 
management are also provided, along with suggestions for future research. 
Between 2000 and 2004, MC enrollees in states that enacted moderate-intensity 
regulations reported their Doctor asked about other treatments they were taking at 
higher rates than enrollees in states that remained with low-intensity regulations. This 
suggests after the passage of moderate-intensity backlash regulations, Doctors were 
engaging more with their patients, indicative of a trust-based relationship. During the 
managed care backlash, MCOs were characterized as disrupting the patient-doctor 
relationship by interfering with provider treatment decisions (Baker & McClellan, 2001). 
Many of the regulations attempted to address the issue of MCO influence over provider 
and patient choices by allowing Doctors to fully engage with patients, such as by 
discussing all their treatment options. All but two states passed regulations banning 
physician gag orders that prevented providers from discussing treatments with patients 
if the MCO did not cover it. And 31 states banned MCOs from providing financial 
incentives to providers for restricting patient utilization of services. States with 
moderate-intensity regulations had a combination of these types of laws. The positive 
impact on confidence in provider in the second period suggests providers did respond to 
the moderate-intensity backlash regulations by involving patients more in the decision-
making process.  
Results also show no accompanying improvement in confidence in provider was 
found in high-intensity regulation states. Many high-intensity states passed one or more 
of every type of regulation. Therefore, high-intensity states generally had the same 
regulations as moderate-intensity states, just more of them. This means there were also 
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more likely to pass rarer regulations, such as ombudsman programs and liability 
regulations. The lack of effect on confidence in provider for enrollees in high-intensity 
states, but not moderate-intensity states, may indicate the additional regulations were 
counterproductive. High-intensity regulation states often passed dozens of laws over 
multiple years. Providers may have resented the excessive regulation of care and not 
responded, even if the intent of the laws was to improve patient outcomes. One study 
found increasing rates of regulation limited provider communication with patients 
because providers believe their comments could be used against them in malpractice 
lawsuits (Hamasaki, Takehara, & Hagihara, 2008). Additionally, providers may not 
respond to regulations if they perceive them as having paternalistic motivations 
(Monahan, 2012), such as HMO report card requirements, which insinuate managed 
care providers were offering sub-standard care to their patients.  
Mixed regulatory effects on access to care across the two periods may reflect an 
increase in demand for services due to the regulations. Provider flexibility laws had the 
potential to increase demand for procedures, specifically, the bans on gag orders and 
financial incentives for providers. Managed care enrollees in states that moved from 
low-intensity regulations to moderate- or high-intensity between 1996 and 2000 reported 
relatively more difficulty making an appointment with their Doctor, controlling for 
changes in FFS patients. This could reflect providers not meeting the increased demand 
for services, resulting in a bottleneck for MC enrollees seeking to access care. Likewise, 
between 2000 and 2004, MC enrollees in states that moved from low-intensity 
regulations to moderate- or high- intensity were more likely to report having access to 
Doctors on night or weekend hours. This could also reflect the additional demand for 
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services resulted in providers offering additional hours. In both cases, the regulatory 
effect on access to care is indirect, as none of the regulations directly address ease of 
getting an appointment or PCPs providing additional business hours.  
No significant regulatory effect was found for satisfaction with care. If the 
backlash was driven in part from patient dissatisfaction with utilization constraints and 
MCO interference (Rodwin, 1996), the expectation was satisfaction for MC enrollees in 
states with more intense regulations would improve once those issues were resolved. 
The lack of effect from regulations may partly be explained by the already high 
satisfaction rates for managed care enrollees, as shown in the summary statistics in the 
Results chapter. Additionally, reports of dissatisfaction may have been overblown or 
misinterpreted. In Blendon et al. (1998), HMO enrollees were found to be satisfied with 
care at the same rate as FFS enrollees. Likewise, in the first review by Miller and Luft 
(1997), four out of five papers found MCO enrollees reported less satisfaction than their 
FFS counterparts, though results were significant in only one of those papers. It is also 
possible satisfaction did increase because of the regulations, but only in the second 
period, when the variable was unavailable. This corresponds with the finding that 
confidence in provider only improved in the second period for managed care enrollees 
in moderate-intensity states. 
Health Care Policy and Management Implications 
Much of the uptick in overall health care spending in the early 2000s is attributed 
to the backlash regulations (Pinkovskiy, 2014). This study indicates moderate-intensity 
regulations resulted in benefits to MC enrollees by way of increased access to care and 
confidence in provider in the second half of the backlash, suggesting a potential 
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justification for the increase in spending over the period. Additionally, a spillover effect 
from the regulations may have occurred for FFS enrollees. This analysis shows some 
outcomes were higher for all patients in both periods in states with moderate-intensity 
regulations, not just MC enrollees. Research has found providers who treat a high 
proportion of MC patients end up treating their FFS patients more like MC patients 
compared to providers who treat only FFS patients (Glied & Zivin, 2002). If providers 
generally felt more freedom to discuss treatment options with patients after regulations 
were adopted that banned gag orders and financial incentives, this may have resulted in 
better outcomes for all their patients.  
These results also point out the importance of distinguishing between different 
levels of intensity when discussing the backlash regulations. Managed care enrollees in 
states with moderate-intensity regulations were found to have relatively better access to 
care and confidence in provider in the second half of the backlash. The results also 
show MC enrollees in states with high-intensity regulations did not report increases in 
confidence in provider in the second period like they did in moderate-intensity regulation 
states. And the positive effect for high-intensity access to care in 2004 was almost the 
same as for moderate-intensity states. This indicates that more regulations did not 
translate into better outcomes, instead it was the mix of regulations that mattered. 
Positive results only in the latter part of the backlash coincide with a prediction by Noble 
and Brennan (1999) that managed care backlash regulations would become more 
nuanced, and more impactive, as the years went on as legislators learned how to write 
more effective laws using earlier regulations as a guide.  
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 The managed care backlash was precipitated by widespread patient and provider 
dissatisfaction with care (Baker & McClellan, 2001). However, the results of this study 
indicate satisfaction with care and ability to access care was already very high for both 
MC and FFS enrollees during the backlash. In 1996, over 95% of MC and FFS 
respondents said they were satisfied with their care and over 90% said they had no 
difficulty accessing care and were satisfied with their ability to access care (Table 9a). 
Likewise, over 95% of all patients said they were confident in their doctor and that their 
doctor listened to them. Despite high marks for these generalize questions, more 
pointed questions about access to care and confidence in provider suggest issues exist 
beneath the surface. Less than half of all respondents in 1996 reported no difficulty 
accessing providers on nights and weekends or having no difficulty contacting providers 
by phone (Table 9a). Policymakers have begun using PROs as part of value-based 
reimbursement arrangements, such as Accountable Care Organizations that pay 
doctors or hospitals to meet certain cost and quality benchmarks, including high scores 
on certain aspects of satisfaction with care and access to care (Highfill & Ozcan, 2016). 
These types of delivery models may consider using specific questions about aspects of 
quality over the more generalized questions that tend to always skew positive. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 This study helps inform the scant research on the impact on patient outcomes 
from the hundreds of states managed care backlash regulations passed between 1996-
2004. The results of this analysis find the regulations did improve access to care and 
confidence in providers for MC patients in the second half of the backlash. This is the 
same period Pinkovskiy (2014) attributes increases in health care spending to the 
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backlash regulations. Future research may pursue a genuine cost-benefit analysis by 
combining patient outcomes and health care spending into a single study to determine a 
monetary value of the regulatory benefits. Additionally, a different data source besides 
MEPS, one that is not constrained by confidentiality rules, is desirable for future 
research that requires state-level analysis. Since this study was only permitted to test 
one version of state intensity categories, a robustness check could not be performed to 
see what impact, if any, resulted from giving rarer regulations more weight and 
contributed to states being categorized as high-intensity. This is potentially significant 
considering high-intensity regulation states were not found to have the same positive 
effect as moderate-intensity states.  
Conclusion 
This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the impact of state 
regulations on patient-reported quality of care and mortality for managed care enrollees. 
The stated goal of the backlash regulations was to ensure patients received good 
quality of care (Zelman, 1999). The results of this analysis show the managed care 
backlash regulations had the intended effect of improving access to care and 
confidence in provider for MC enrollees states that adopted moderate-intensity 
regulations in the second half of the backlash. The positive effect on access to care was 
similar in states that adopted high-intensity regulations. However, no positive effect was 
found in the first period for any outcome. These results show that states with the most 
intense backlash did not realize better patient outcomes, instead, outcomes were most 
impacted by the composition of regulations in each state.   
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Appendix Table 1a. Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control 
parameters: Access to Care and Confidence in Provider (for Table 10a) 
Appendix Table 1b. Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control 
parameters: Satisfaction and Mortality (for Table 10a) 
Appendix Table 1c. Marginal effects and standard errors for 2000-2004 control 
parameters (for Table 10b) 
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Appendix Table 1a  
Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control parameters: Access to Care and Confidence in Provider (for 
Table 10a) 
  Access to Care   Confidence in Provider 
  
Doctor has 
night or 
weekend 
hours 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by 
phone 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
accessing 
care 
Patient is 
satisfied 
with ability 
to access 
care 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
getting an 
appointment 
 
Doctor 
asks 
patient if 
he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
Doctor 
listens to 
patient 
Patient is 
confident 
in Doctor 
Income ($000s), 
1996 dollars 
-0.0003** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 3.02E-05 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Race: Black -0.0359*** -0.0127 0.0282*** 0.0106 0.0148 0.0381*** 0.0047 -0.0006 
 (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0161) (0.0108) (0.0044) (0.0050) 
Race: Other 0.0067 -0.0102 -0.0136 -0.0110 -0.0757** 0.0116 0.0043 -0.0069 
 (0.0167) (0.0183) (0.0122) (0.0097) (0.0306) (0.0152) (0.0083) (0.0082) 
Education: No 
high school 
degree 
0.0784*** 0.0387*** -0.0036 0.0048 0.0625*** -0.0323*** 0.0036 0.0074** 
 (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0102) (0.0060) (0.0031) (0.0034) 
Education: 
College degree 
-0.0209** -0.0216*** 0.0018 0.0113** -0.0282** 0.0115 0.0017 0.0029 
 (0.0083) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0110) (0.0070) (0.0037) (0.0040) 
  
1
2
3 
(Appendix Table 1a continued) 
  Access to Care   Confidence in Provider 
  
Doctor 
has night 
or 
weekend 
hours 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by 
phone 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
accessing 
care 
Patient is 
satisfied 
with ability 
to access 
care 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
getting an 
appointment 
 
Doctor 
asks 
patient if 
he/she is 
taking 
other 
treatments 
Doctor 
listens to 
patient 
Patient is 
confident 
in Doctor 
Female -0.0128*** 0.0068 0.0012 0.0009 0.0018 
 
-0.0070** -0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0059) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0021) 
Hispanic -0.0246* -0.0328*** -0.0028 -0.0159*** -0.0536*** 0.0664*** -0.0123*** -0.0030 
 (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0094) (0.0052) (0.0159) (0.0095) (0.0037) (0.0045) 
Metropolitan 
Statistical Area 
0.156*** -0.0214 -0.0011 -0.0024 0.0100 0.0050 0.0001 -0.0038 
 (0.0169) (0.0153) (0.0075) (0.0054) (0.0183) (0.0123) (0.0047) (0.0055) 
Married -0.0316*** 0.0014 0.0124** 0.0107*** -0.0196* 0.0151*** -0.0032 -0.0025 
 (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0105) (0.0052) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Chronic 
condition 
-0.0365*** -0.0005 -0.0236*** -0.0103*** -0.0218** -0.0087 0.0004 -0.0018 
 (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0088) (0.0055) (0.0034) (0.0039) 
Whole county 
PCP shortage 
-0.0420*** -0.0021 -0.0085 -0.0034 0.0032 -0.0241** -0.0072 -0.0122** 
 (0.0162) (0.0139) (0.0084) (0.0076) (0.0173) (0.0105) (0.0050) (0.0057) 
Partial county 
PCP shortage 
-0.0343** 0.0255* -0.0045 -0.0017 0.0055 -0.0170 -0.0050 -0.0098* 
 (0.0161) (0.0148) (0.0092) (0.0079) (0.0184) (0.0109) (0.0049) (0.0056) 
Self-reported 
poor health 
-0.0107 -0.0148 -0.0417*** -0.0373*** -0.0049 0.0146* -0.0148*** 
-
0.0118*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0061) (0.0052) (0.0127) (0.0080) (0.0039) (0.0043) 
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(Appendix Table 1a continued) 
  Access to Care   Confidence in Provider 
  
Doctor has 
night or 
weekend 
hours 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by 
phone 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
accessing 
care 
Patient is 
satisfied 
with ability 
to access 
care 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
getting an 
appointment 
 
Doctor asks 
patient if 
he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
Doctor 
listens to 
patient 
Patient is 
confident 
in Doctor 
Medicare: 
Aged 
-0.145*** 0.0048 0.0963*** 0.0390*** 0.0310** 
 
-0.0341*** 0.0015 0.0178*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0092) (0.0070) (0.0131) (0.0073) (0.0039) (0.0054) 
Medicare: 
Disability 
-0.0224 0.0351 -0.0043 -0.0022 0.0091 0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0026 
 (0.0203) (0.0216) (0.0121) (0.0083) (0.0272) (0.0154) (0.0076) (0.0091) 
Medicaid -0.0693*** -0.0208* -0.0660*** -0.0398*** -0.0331** -0.0084 -0.0122*** -0.0138*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0109) (0.0069) (0.0050) (0.0156) (0.0091) (0.0039) (0.0051) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
  
  
1
2
5 
Appendix Table 1b  
Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control parameters: Satisfaction and Mortality (for Table 10a) 
  Satisfaction   Mortality 
 Patient is satisfied with care 
 
Patient did not die during the 
survey year, or year after 
Income ($000s), 1996 dollars -1.80E-05 6.74e-05** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Race: Black 0.0108* -0.0006 
 (0.0061) (0.0009) 
Race: Other -0.0054 0.0048** 
 (0.0111) (0.0022) 
Education: No high school degree 0.0013 0.0007 
 (0.0036) (0.0008) 
Education: College degree 0.00793* 0.0008 
 (0.0043) (0.0011) 
Female -0.0021 0.0041*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0007) 
Hispanic 0.0002 0.0028** 
 (0.0050) (0.0013) 
Metropolitan Statistical Area -0.0106** 0.0006 
 (0.0052) (0.0007) 
 
  
1
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(Appendix Table 1b continued) 
  Satisfaction   Mortality 
  Patient is satisfied with care 
 
Patient did not die during the 
survey year, or year after 
Married -0.0028 0.0012* 
 (0.0037) (0.0007) 
Chronic condition -0.0067* -0.0044*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0012) 
Whole county PCP shortage -0.0030 -0.0003 
 (0.0065) (0.0010) 
Partial county PCP shortage 0.0032 -0.0009 
 (0.0063) (0.0011) 
Self-reported poor health -0.0177*** -0.0087*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0009) 
Medicare: Aged 0.0328*** -0.0146*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0012) 
Medicare: Disability 0.0112 -0.0046** 
 (0.0098) (0.0020) 
Medicaid -0.0116** -2.22E-05 
 (0.0054) (0.0011) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Appendix Table 1c  
Marginal effects and standard errors for 2000-2004 control parameters (for Table 10b) 
  Access to Care   
Confidence in 
Provider 
 
Mortality 
  
Doctor has night 
or weekend 
hours 
Patient has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by phone 
 
Doctor asks 
patient if he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
Patient did not 
die during the 
survey year, or 
year after 
Income ($000s), 1996 
dollars 
-0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 6.57e-05** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Race: Black -0.0360*** -0.0128 0.0380*** -0.0006 
 (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0108) (0.0009) 
Race: Other 0.0087 -0.0131 0.0110 0.0047** 
 (0.0169) (0.0182) (0.0153) (0.0022) 
Education: No high school 
degree 
0.0780*** 0.0390*** -0.0323*** 0.0007 
 (0.0080) (0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0008) 
Education: College degree -0.0219*** -0.0195** 0.0107 0.0007 
 (0.0083) (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0008) 
Female -0.0128*** 0.0062 -0.0069**  0.0007 
 (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0033)  (0.0011) 
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(Appendix Table 1c continued) 
  Access to Care   
Confidence in 
Provider 
 
Mortality 
  
Doctor has night 
or weekend 
hours 
Patient has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by phone 
 
Doctor asks 
patient if he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
Patient did not 
die during the 
survey year, or 
year after 
Hispanic -0.0247* -0.0281** 0.0646*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0094) (0.0007) 
Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.155*** -0.0104 0.0009 0.0028** 
 (0.0171) (0.0150) (0.0125) (0.0013) 
Married -0.0319*** 0.0022 0.0149*** 0.0006 
 (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0052) (0.0007) 
Chronic condition -0.0358*** -0.0053 -0.0083 0.0012* 
 (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0055) (0.0007) 
Whole county PCP shortage -0.0414** -0.0004 -0.0249** -0.0003 
 (0.0161) (0.0137) (0.0104) (0.0010) 
Partial county PCP shortage -0.0345** 0.0243* -0.0161  -0.0008 
 (0.0160) (0.0146) (0.0108)  (0.0011) 
Self-reported poor health -0.0115 -0.0125 0.0144*  -0.0087*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0080)  (0.0009) 
 
  
  
1
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(Appendix Table 1c continued) 
  Access to Care   
Confidence in 
Provider 
 
Mortality 
  
Doctor has night 
or weekend 
hours 
Patient has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by phone 
 
Doctor asks 
patient if he/she 
is taking other 
treatments 
Patient did not die 
during the survey 
year, or year after 
Medicare: Aged -0.146*** 0.0083 -0.0355*** -0.0145*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0072) (0.0012) 
Medicare: Disability -0.0236 0.0370* 0.0031 -0.0045** 
 (0.0204) (0.0216) (0.0153) (0.0020) 
Medicaid -0.0687*** -0.0224**  -0.0089 0.0000 
 (0.0119) (0.0109)  (0.0092) (0.0011) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Appendix B 
 
Appendix Table 2a. Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Access to Care and 
Confidence in Provider (no control variables)  
Appendix Table 2b. Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Satisfaction with Care 
and Mortality (no control variables) 
Appendix Table 2c. Marginal effects for 2000-2004 base model (no control variables) 
 
 
  
1
3
1
 
Appendix Table 2a  
Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Access to Care and Confidence in Provider (no control variables) 
  Access to Care   Confidence in Provider 
  
Doctor 
has night 
or 
weekend 
hours 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
Doctor by 
phone 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
accessing 
care 
Patient is 
satisfied 
with ability 
to access 
care 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
getting an 
appointment 
 
Doctor asks 
patient if 
he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
Doctor 
listens to 
patient 
Patient is 
confident in 
Doctor 
y2000 -0.0072 -0.0828*** 0.0055 0.0028 0.0021 0.0519*** 0.0082 -0.0050 
  (0.0168) (0.0148) (0.0142) (0.0089) (0.0244) (0.0149) (0.0069) (0.0074) 
Managed 
Care 
(MC) 
0.101*** -0.0282** -0.0006 0.0168*** -0.0096 -0.0188* 0.0012 -0.0157*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0045) (0.0051) 
Moderate 
(Mod) 
0.0277* 0.0953*** -0.0180 -0.0169 0.0324 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0079 
  (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0116) (0.0315) (0.0139) (0.0075) (0.0087) 
High -0.0806*** 0.0757*** -0.0334* -0.0274*** 0.0167 0.0066 -0.0034 0.0033 
  (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0102) (0.0271) (0.0118) (0.0081) (0.0087) 
MC * 
y2000 
-0.0080 0.0011 0.0318* 0.0191 0.0297 -0.0278* 0.0058 0.0114 
  (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0123) (0.0309) (0.0166) (0.0094) (0.0099) 
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(Appendix Table 2a continued) 
  Access to Care   Confidence in Provider 
  
Doctor 
has night 
or 
weekend 
hours 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
PCP by 
phone 
Patient 
has no 
difficulty 
accessing 
care 
Patient is 
satisfied 
with 
ability to 
access 
care 
Patient has 
no difficulty 
getting an 
appointment 
 
Doctor asks 
patient if 
he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
Doctor 
listens to 
patient 
Patient is 
confident in 
Doctor 
MC * 
Moderate 
0.0114 0.0207 0.0295 0.0256* -0.0522 
 
0.0239 -0.0075 -0.0005 
  (0.0211) (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0152) (0.0330) (0.0177) (0.0105) (0.0125) 
MC * 
High 
0.0237 -0.0031 0.0063 -0.0055 -0.0645* 0.0156 -0.0097 0.0008 
  (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0214) (0.0148) (0.0352) (0.0170) (0.0108) (0.0125) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Appendix Table 2b 
Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Satisfaction with Care and Mortality (no control variables) 
  Satisfaction 
 
 Mortality 
  
Patient is satisfied with 
care 
 
Patient did not die during 
the survey year, or year 
after 
y2000 -0.0042 y2000 -0.0012 
  (0.0083)  (0.0014) 
Managed Care (MC) -0.0171** MC 0.0179*** 
  (0.0071)  (0.0025) 
Moderate (Mod) -0.0194** ModHigh 0.0001 
  (0.0088)  (0.0013) 
High -0.0077 
 
  (0.0099) 
MC * y2000 0.0293** MC * y2000 0.0063* 
  (0.0132)  (0.0037) 
MC * Moderate -0.0071 MC * ModHigh -0.0012 
  (0.0136)  (0.0014) 
MC * High -0.0156  
  (0.0153) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Appendix Table 2c 
Marginal effects for 2000-2004 base model (no control variables) 
  Access to Care 
 Confidence in 
Provider 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mortality 
  
Doctor has 
night or 
weekend hours 
Patient has no 
difficulty 
contacting PCP 
by phone 
Doctor asks 
patient if he/she 
is taking other 
treatments 
 
Patient did 
not die 
during the 
survey 
year, or 
year after 
y2004 -0.0631** 0.137*** -0.0163 y2004 0.0006 
  (0.0282) (0.0298) (0.0245)  (0.0025) 
MC 0.101*** -0.0220* -0.0254** MC 0.0189*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0114)  (0.0027) 
Moderate  0.0383 0.0328 0.0513*** ModHigh -0.0023 
  (0.0252) (0.0238) (0.0199)  (0.0018) 
High -0.0868*** -0.0278 0.0709*** 
 
  (0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0182) 
MC * y2004 -0.0840** 0.0464 0.0085 MC * y2004 -0.0060 
  (0.0380) (0.0313) (0.0310)  (0.0060) 
MC * Moderate -0.0082 0.0012 -0.0266 MC * ModHigh 0.0094** 
  (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0211)  (0.0047) 
MC * High 0.0089 0.0126 -0.0151 
 
  (0.0257) (0.0248) (0.0265) 
Mod * y2004 0.0267 -0.0297 -0.0542* ModHigh * y2004 0.0033 
  (0.0408) (0.0395) (0.0324)  (0.0030) 
High * y2004 0.0594 0.0255 -0.0689** 
 
  (0.0374) (0.0365) (0.0311) 
 
  
1
3
5
 
(Appendix Table 2c continued) 
 Access to Care 
 Confidence in 
Provider 
 
 Mortality 
 
Doctor has 
night or 
weekend 
hours 
Patient has no 
difficulty 
contacting 
PCP by phone 
Doctor asks 
patient if 
he/she is 
taking other 
treatments 
 
Patient did not 
die during the 
survey year, 
or year after 
MC * Mod * y2004 0.107** -0.0095 0.0782** MC*ModHigh * y2004 0.0003 
  (0.0500) (0.0420) (0.0379)  (0.0080) 
MC * High * y2004 0.103** -0.0653 0.0265 
 
  (0.0478) (0.0414) (0.0424) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 136 
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